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PART
2
Q:What
would you personally hope to see come out of the talks?
A:
I want them to be successful, personally and officially,
and the UN will assist in every way possible. It is a very
unusual process because it has the support of the people.
It is
questioned by SOME of the leaders - although I have to stress
that the line, or the language, used by some of the leaders
should be seen as part of a political process rather than
definitive statements.
We saw
that when Abdullahi Yusuf (Puntland) came out against it,
there were demonstrations. There were demonstrations in Mogadishu
when Hussein Aideed came out against the process.
There
were even demonstrations in Bakool when Shati Gaduud came
out against it. Now Shatu Gaduud is giving it his support,
and now there is a strong delegation from Puntland in Arta,
Djibouti.
Many people
who are close to Aideed are there, although not Hussein Aideed
himself. It is trying to learn the lessons of the past and
move away from leader- based processes to grassroots-based
processes.
In that
context ofcourse, some of the political leaders are armed,
so we hope the clans will move toward peace and disarm their
own armed branches.
There
will be a problem if they do not do so. My hope is that the
international community will respond at the right moment and
will assist the Somalis in that process, so that we face disarmament
and the formation of a national force - a national defence
force or a national police force to protect the country.
This will
not be an international peace keeping force. That is not on
the agenda. There will not even be a regional peacekeeping
force. What they will need is assistance in verifying a process
which is going to be Somali this time.
Q:
Do you not think the UN and the humanitarian community would
be more in a position to encourage positive developments in
Somalia if it was based there instead of in Nairobi?
A:
I strongly agree with that. The UN withdrew from Somalia in
March 1995 after the collapse of UNOSOM. At that stage two
of the then-major warlords, General Mohamed Farah Aideed and
Ali Mahdi, said they did not want the UN there.
They said
they could not guarantee the safety of the UN. The then- Secretary-General
(Boutros) Boutros Ghali said the UN would return when conditions
allowed it. That is over four years ago.
Now there
are cases of violence in Somalia, but one could say the civil
war has largely run its course. Most of the Somalis do not
have a stomach for civil war as such. We do have on-going
problems - like land taken by one clan from another. We do
have a lot of arms in the society and a lot of banditry.
But in
Mogadishu, in particular, there does seem to be a complete
change since 1995. This is partly the result of the Djibouti
process and partly the result of the information getting through
the new media there.
I very
much hope we can look forward to returning to Somalia this
year, as a UN family. But if the process fails or it goes
badly wrong - I would say this as a general conclusion - then
we are looking something very, very serious in the eye. We
are looking at the failure of the international community
to assist sufficiently a people who are without a government,
without institutions - which I believe has many lessons for
the rest of Africa.
One of
the problems with Somalia is that it is seen as a failure
of the UN and of the international community. If you look
at it as a case where warlordism has failed to provide a way
forward then you have to do something new. That is what we
are trying.
If that
fails and you have a people without a nation, who are just
going to try and continue to fend for themselves, then that
is going to be a very serious warning for the rest of Africa.
Most people in Somalia are untouched by government and have
no education or health services.
There
are some facilities that are run by the private sector that
work well, like telecommunications, but the vast majority
of people are subsisting in an environment which is deteriorating.
The humanitarian
situation is a product of political circumstances ...(and)
... one effect of the lack of government is the total lack
of protection of the environment (including) indiscriminate
fishing in territorial waters.
If the
Djibouti process takes off there will be a bandwagon for peace
and there will be more resources for the international community
to go back and contribute. Many, many aid agencies, NGO's,
foreign governments have had their fingers burned in Somalia
- there is great hesitation because of the violence and the
looting.
If there
is a Djibouti process and the people are seen to support it,
the conditions would be right for our return.
Q:
Why has the UN failed in Somalia?
A:
The problem is that Somalia at the end of the Cold War ceased
to be of strategic interest to any major power. Before, it
was fought over by the superpowers. So one of the problems
is indifference.
The other
issue is one of conceptualisation. If you define the problem
in Somalia as one of warlordism and try and deal with that,
you're missing the crucial point that it is a collapse of
institutions.
It was
the massive intervention that was designed to put back a state
that failed. That is unfortunate. I think I am right in saying
that UNOSOM 2 was the largest-ever peacekeeping operation
- I think the total, which was never reached, was to be 40,000
peacekeepers.
We have
now gone to a situation were there is minimal UN involvement
in Somalia. My office is microscopic compared to UNOSOM. We
are a very small observer mission, a political reporting mission.
The Somalis
have had several years of hell, I think, to reflect. I think
the atmosphere now is very positive.
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