| By
Jama Mohamed Ghalib
On
Friday, 28 July 2006, member of parliament (MP) and
former speaker of the Somali parliament, Abdalla Deero
Isaaq, was murdered just as he had stepped out of
the main Mosque in Baidoa after the weekly congregation
of the Friday prayers. Despite that crowded scene
of so many worshippers nobody saw the killer(s). The
transitional government (TFG) of premier Ali Mohamed
Geedi was facing a challenge of no vote of confidence
in parliament the next day. It survived. Again, on
Monday, 18 September 2006, the TFG was seeking a confidence
vote in parliament after a major reshuffle following
dismissal of Geedis previous government by president
Abdullahi Yusuf.
The
president addressed parliament just before voting
would begin and left the hall. As his convoy of escort
vehicles moved, one of them that must have had been
secretly dynamited exploded, killing about a dozen
of people and wounding many others, majority of them
members of the presidential guard and also including
a Ugandan national. The explosion also destroyed a
number of motor vehicles that were at stationary outside
the make shift parliament hall. No doubt the act was
an assassination attempt on the life of the president
who escaped unhurt. And again nobody saw the perpetrator(s)
in such broad daylight.
Despite such disastrous situation, premier Ali Mohamed
Geedi remained seated undisturbed and managed to prevail
over the parliament to vote on his government and
won. This was, however, after so many MPs had left
the hall in order to see the extent of the disaster
and were replaced by many outsiders of non-MPs who
might have been pre-arranged, they rushed into the
hall and raised their hands in favor of government
when a vote of show of hands was taken, as has been
complained by very credible personalities among the
MPs.
The scenario of the Baidoa Mysteries shows an orchestrated
pattern of expertly executed assassinations and attempted
assassinations so that each time Geedis TFG
is in constitutional crisis; it wins by deceit or
by intimidation. To be valid, however, this rationale
must stand the test of answering the following two
conundrums:
1. Who could be the expert executor(s) of such hideous
crimes without leaving any clues of their identity
(ies)? Somali personnel formerly trained for such
operations are no longer around. They were among the
first to leave the country at the collapse of state
authority, more than a decade and a half ago. To the
best of my knowledge, the only likely ones are Ethiopian
agents who are freely around and mixed up with the
TFG affairs.
2. Could the Ethiopians ever contemplate assassinating
Abdullahi Yusuf?
The Ethiopians unreservedly supported Abdullahi Yusuf
to win the Somali presidency by manipulating the IGAD
sponsored conference for a number of reasons including:
a)
Among all its Somali clients, Abdullahi was the only
one who had the chance of winning and, therefore,
the only one worthy of their investment;
b) Abdullahi had demonstrated his aversion to Islamic
principles whether because of his personal nature,
or by design vis-à-vis his relations with the
Tigre-led Ethiopian officials.
However,
the Ethiopian investment in Abdullahi Yusuf was only
for a short term. By the same token, Abdullahis
association with Ethiopia, although it has irreversibly
already cost him the trust of the Somali people may
not be perpetual either.
The short term for the Ethiopian investment in Abdullahi
Yusuf has almost come to its end. Abdullahi is not
easily manipulateable animal. His relation with the
Ethiopians was forged, in the first place, during
the Mengistu regime. They could not, however, continue
putting up with his rigidity and he was locked-up
and indefinitely detained until the fall of that regime.
And secondly, despite close association with the Ethiopians,
after all Abdullahi wants a Somali government of his
own choice to be in place. The Ethiopians want a Somali
government of their choice or none of it. The convergence
of interests between Abdullahi Yusuf and the Ethiopians
ends there as far as the latter is concerned.
On his part, Abdullahi Yusuf still needs the Ethiopians,
because he wants to impose his will and authority
on the Somali people under cover of foreign forces
instead of reconciliation and compromises. The only
feasibly available foreign forces are the Ethiopians.
Any other forces, even if available, would need prior
funding, which may not be easily forthcoming. The
Ethiopians would want funding too for the deployment
of their forces, but that is dispensable when it comes
to their deployment in Somalia. Because their forces
in the Somali and Oromo regions never ever have full
budgets or no budgets at all, apart from their military
equipment and uniforms. They have been living upon
the resources of the conquered peoples since the Menelik
era. So, any such deployment will only be an increased
extension of those forces already in the Somali region
of Ethiopia.
Abdullahi knows the Ethiopians well as much as they
know him too. He wants their forces to come through
IGAD and AU so that he may ask them to leave if and
when it suits him. This is also ok with the Ethiopians,
but only as a short term, because they want to come
to Somalia with legitimacy if at all possible, but
for their geopolitical interests.
Abdullahi Yusuf wants power to govern Somalia that
may run counter to Ethiopias geopolitical interests.
Ali Mohamed Geedi's priority is to fulfill the wishes
of his sponsors.
According to a statement by Geedis representative
in Addis Ababa during a recent BCC interview, Geedis
TFG must have had already given a carte blanche for
Ethiopian forces to enter Somalia at their whims even
before the parliaments approval, during the
TFGs seat in Jowhar. Even Abdullahi Yusuf might
not have been made aware of the exact nature of that
agreement. The only release of it made public was
that of co-operation between the two countries. Abdullahi
Yusuf also confided in some MPs that the entry of
Ethiopian forces into the country during last July
was without his knowledge. Abdullahi is not a man
given to tolerate such double crossing.
Abdillahi Yusuf made a big mistake when he accepted
Ali Mohamed Geedi, a man chosen by Ethiopia and appointed
him as his prime minister. Had he not done that he
would remain their only (Ethiopians) best Somali connection.
Therefore, the answer to the 2nd question: above "Could
the Ethiopians ever contemplate assassinating Abdullahi
Yusuf ?" Is yes! Geedi is more useful to them
now onwards and they must liquidate Abdullahi Yusuf
before he sacks Geedi. Ethiopian military presence
in Somalia already exists in abundance. And if the
attempted assassination succeeded they would have
immediately exerted their authority and intimidated
the parliament to elect Geedi to the Somali presidency.
Geedi would then in turn appoint another Ethiopian
supplicant as premier.
Abdullahi Yusuf is no doubt quite savvy of these Ethiopian
mischiefs, but he is most unlikely to divulge a word
of it. He is given the stamina for such endurance.
He has already pretended suspecting Al-Qa'eda and
terrorism at large and is expected to stay on that
course. Other TFG officials have given contradictory
statements about the last incident. The most plausible
of these is that of the minister of the interior,
Hussein Aideed, according to his interview with the
Xog-Ogaal Newspaper of Wed. 19 September 2006, p.2,
and quote as per translation from Somali"
"Investigation is in progress to find out who
was behind this act. Up to now the government cannot
accuse any body until the investigation is concluded."
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