Russian
& East German Documents on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, 1977-78
Memorandum
of Conversation between [SED] Comrade Friedel Trappen and Soviet Comrade R.
A. Ulyanovsky in the CC of the CPSU, 11 May 1978
[Other participants]
Ulyanovsky:
As Comrade B.N. Ponomarev has already pointed out
in the last conversation with the comrades of the SED, the CC of the CPSU
considers the talks of the SED with the Eritrean movements and the Ethiopian
side very useful and positive. We can still say this today. On this basis
one should approach the next meeting in June as well as other meetings. We
consider the four points agreed on at the last meeting as positive. If both
sides really take the four points as a starting point, this would be positive
for further development. We are of the opinion that the following main points
should be emphasized:
a) The political solution of the problem and an
end to the bloodshed.
b) The granting of regional autonomy for Eritrea,
but, however, no separate national independence.
c) The unconditional use of Ethiopia's communications
with the ports on the Red Sea.
d) The increased unification of the progressive
forces on both sides.
This would be a deeply satisfying platform which
could be developed further.
The points agreed upon in the March meeting are
contained in these proposals and hence could be developed further at the June
meeting. This would create a real foundation for the rapprochement of both
sides. The main question is, how honestly, how genuinely, and how deeply both
sides will comply with these points. If one could say today that the four
points are fulfilled by both sides or will soon be fulfilled, this would be
a great relief for us.
The CPSU also works in this direction. It agreed
to receive an ELF-RC delegation led by Ahmed Mohammed Nasser at the level
of the USSR Solidarity Committee on a confidential internal basis around 20
May 1978. We will use these contacts in order to induce the representatives
of the ELF-RC to have direct contact with the Provisional Military Administrative
Council. The objective is to find an appropriate solution for Eritrea within
the framework of the Ethiopian state. We do not have the intention to hide
from Ahmed Nasser our policy toward a unified Ethiopia. The policy of the
CPSU is aimed at the unity of Ethiopia. We will try to convince Ahmed Nasser
that the future development of the Eritrean people can only evolve in a unified
Ethiopian state. In the discussions we will continue to pursue the line of
emphasizing the unity between the Marxist-Leninist forces and national-democratic
forces in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
We would like to stress that we have to be extremely
tactful in our relations with Mengistu Haile Mariam and the PMAC, in particular
with respect to the Eritrean question.
Mengistu Haile Mariam does not have an easy stand
within the PMAC in this regard. In connection with the well-known Dr. Negede
[Gobeze] affair tensions have heightened within the PMAC and this has not
made Mengistu's task any easier.
We would like to emphasize that all concrete initiatives
on the Eritrean questions have to originate from Ethiopia. This does not mean
that the Eritrean side is free of any initiatives. If we put the entire weight
on the Mengistu Haile Mariam's shoulders and free Ahmed Nasser or respectively
Aforki of any responsibility, this would be one-sided. The Ethiopian side
is watching with great jealousy the actions of the CPSU and the SED. Here
as well one has to see the connection between Mengistu Haile Mariam's position
and the people around him. Mengistu Haile Mariam deserves to be regarded by
us as a man who represents internationalist positions. By contrast to him,
Berhanu Bayeh and Fikre Selassie as well as Legesse Asfaw and others, for
example, are marked by nationalism although they are faithful to Mengistu
Haile Mariam.
All steps and initiatives on the part of the CPSU,
the CP Cuba, and the SED must be put forward extremely tactfully and carefully
not to cause any protests. Frankly, the problem lies to a certain degree in
the fact that we all attempt to square the circle. The one side of the problem
is - and we are both working on this - to solve the problem on an internationalist
basis. On the other hand there are efforts to solve it on a nationalist basis.
This is precisely why, I emphasize again, we have to apply maximum caution,
circumspection, and tactfulness towards Mengistu Haile Mariam so that the
nationalists will not grasp him by the throat.
In our contacts and talks with Ahmed Nasser we
intend to make it unmistakably clear to him that it is necessary that all
revolutionary forces join together and that the Eritrean problem is not only
a national but above all a class problem which has to be solved by the common
fight against the imperialists and the Arab reaction.
Efforts to split up Ethiopia and create a separate
Eritrean state, to refuse to give Ethiopia access to the ports on the Red
Sea, to drive the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries out of this
region, are not simply a national problem but a problem of international class
warfare, not to speak of the fact that such a separate state would be manipulated
by the Sudan and Saudi Arabia and their petrol dollars.
We will therefore point out to Ahmed Nasser, who
claims to be a Marxist, the national and international dimension of the Eritrean
problem.
Concerning the questions put forward by Comrade
Trappen I would like to add the following consideration:
The basic difficulty is the fact that separatist
ideas have been rooted in Eritrea for a long time. These ideas are very popular
among the population, especially among the workers. This factor, the factor
of the erring of the masses based on nationalism, is a given one. The main
difficulty therefore is that the mass of the Eritrean population does not
understand the difference between the imperial regime of Haile Selassi and
the policy of the PMAC.
The fight continues as in earlier times under the
imperial regime. This creates the great necessity for intensified political
work by the PMAC and above all by Mengistu Haile Mariam towards the Eritrean
population. It was particularly this point that Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev
discussed with Mengistu Haile Mariam during his trip to Moscow.
The PMAC is confronting a decisive, great, and
huge task to get the people of Eritrea on the side of the Ethiopian Revolution.
Preparations have been made but no concrete steps and measures. The Soviet
comrades have told Mengistu Haile Mariam and Legesse that it was now important
to show the Eritrean people that the PMAC is not identical with the regime
of Emperor Haile Selassi and the interests of the Ethiopian Revolution are
in harmony with the interests of the progressive forces in Eritrea. Unfortunately,
forces in the PMAC and Mengistu Haile Mariam himself have caused a slow-down
of this necessary political work towards the people of Eritrea. Mengistu Haile
Mariam is passive.
We completely agree with the estimate that military
actions for the solution of the Eritrean question alone are pointless and,
moreover, dangerous. They would widen the gap between the Eritrean people
and the Ethiopian Revolution and create new intensified hatred. This does
not mean that the PMAC should completely abandon military activities. We think
that it is necessary to exert military pressure on the Eritrean separatists
forces. This especially since in regard to military matters the current situation
in Eritrea is not favorable for the PMAC. It is therefore necessary to talk
but at the same time to act militarily on the part of the PMAC. This applies
in particular to the safeguarding of important military strategic positions
and especially of the communications with the ports of Massawa and Assab
well as the capital Asmara, the cities Akordat, Keren, and Barentu. These
military actions have to serve political measures.
It was emphasized in the talk between Comrade L.I.
Brezhnev and Mengistu Haile Mariam that it is necessary for the PMAC to address
itself to the Eritrean people. This political initiative is extremely acute
today as never before. We deem it necessary that both the CPSU and the SED
together exert influence on Mengistu Haile Mariam in this respect. We have
to take into consideration that the position of the Eritrean movements has
not become any less obstinate, because they still demand the separation of
Eritrea. This shows that there are no honest efforts for a political solution
on the part of the Eritrean representatives. Therefore it is correct to work
for a change in the current position of the Eritrean movements. It is especially
necessary to receive from them a declaration pledging that self-determination
for the Eritrean people will be achieved within the framework of a Ethiopian
state. We received an information [report] in early May according to which
direct contacts had been established between the PMAC and the EPLF. We do
not know anything about the substance of these contacts. With respect to the
concrete question whether it makes sense to continue the negotiations or to
await military actions, Comrade Ulyanovsky stated that both sides had to be
induced to [take part in] further negotiations and that at the same time a
certain limited military pressure was quite useful, meaning that even with
the continuation of the negotiation efforts certain military actions
could not be precluded.
Concerning the question on the concrete coordination
between the CPSU, the SED, and the Cuban CP, Comrade Ulyanovsky emphasized
that all bilateral contacts with the Cuban CP are excellent and that the same
applied to the SED. There has been no exchange of opinion with the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen on the part of the CPSU. They have, as is well
known, pulled their troops out of Ethiopia. One has to take into consideration
that the situation in the PDR Yemen is difficult. The PDR Yemen has to be
protected.
Comrade Ulyanovsky agreed to put the proposal for
the creation of a mechanism for consultation and coordination before the leadership
of the CPSU. Concerning the question of a possible later public announcement
of our parties on the Eritrean question (in some form), it is expedient to
examine this in the light of the Moscow talks with Ahmed Nasser and the planned
third meeting of the Ethiopian and Eritrean sides with the SED.
With respect to the question of expert consultations
on variants of a solution, it is possible at any time for GDR scientists [specialists]
to consult with Soviet comrades about concrete questions. Comrade Ulyanovsky
thinks that at this point these contacts should be limited to the level of
the International Relations Departments of the Central Committees. With respect
to the involvement of CPSU experts in the consultation and negotiations at
the third meeting, Comrade Ulyanovsky stated that he would put this question
before the party leadership for decision. Concerning the guarantees called
for by the Eritrean side, one can only get more precise on this point after
concrete results have been achieved on the question of what, who, and to whom
in some matter guarantees might be given.
Finally, Comrade Ulyanovsky pointed out that the
attempt to keep the Ethiopian leadership from its military advance through
us was a very delicate matter. The PMAC was predominantly of the opinion that
even a political solution of the Eritrean question was not possible without
a strengthening of Ethiopia's military positions in Eritrea and that the liberation
of above-mentioned ports and cities can only be achieved by military means.
The PMAC assumed that only then [would] actual and basic conditions exist
for negotiations with the separatists.[...]
[Source:
SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian
F. Ostermann.]
