Russian
& East German Documents on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, 1977-78
Soviet
Foreign Ministry and CPSU CC International Department, Background Report on
the Somali-Ethiopian Conflict, 3 April 1978
Secret,
Copy No. 3
Issue
164/3afo
IV.03.78
ABOUT
THE SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA CONFLICT
(Information
Sheet)
Since the time of the formation of an independent
Somalian state in 1960, there has been tension in inter-state relations on
the Horn of Africa. Its source is the aspiration of the leadership of
Somalia to unite the lands populated by Somali tribes in a single state and
the claims it has made in that regard to certain regions of Ethiopia (Ogaden),
Kenya, and the territory of the Republic of Djibouti.
Relations are particularly sharp between Somalia
and Ethiopia. On multiple occasions border incidents and military conflict
have broken out between them.
The revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 did not lead
to an improvement in Somalia-Ethiopia relations. More to the point,
President Siad and other Somali leaders, using as a cover demagogic declarations
about the right of nations to self-determination, right up to secession, have
intensified their pressure on Ethiopia. The Somalis in essence have
demanded the partition of the multi-national Ethiopian state on the basis
of ethnicity. These demands were obviously aimed against the interests
of the Ethiopian revolution and poured grist on the mill of internal and external
reaction.
In these conditions the USSR and other socialist
states undertook efforts to normalize relations between Ethiopia and the Democratic
Republic of Somalia (SDR). In March 1977, at the initiative of Fidel
Castro with the participation of the chairman of the Presidential Council
of the PDRY S. Rubayi Ali, a meeting took place in Aden between the Chairman
of the PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam and the President of the SDR Siad, which
due to the unconstructive position of the latter ended without result.
The Soviet Union more than once appealed to the
leadership of Somalia and Ethiopia with a call to normalize their relations
and proposed a constructive program which would lead to a settlement, and
indicated its readiness to make available its good offices. In July-August
1977, in the course of separate meetings with representative of Somalia and
Ethiopia who were visiting Moscow, it was found that the sides were occupying
mutually-exclusive positions; moreover the Somalis were continuing to insist
on wresting the Ogaden away from Ethiopia.
Insofar as plans to obtain the Ogaden without the
application of force did not come to fruition, the Somali leadership, in which
chauvinistic moods came to dominate, set about the practical realization of
its expansionist plans, counting on achieving success in relation to the domestic
political situation in Ethiopia, which was aggravated at that time.
The Arab reaction also pushed them to this, and also imperialist states, in
particular the USA, which, according to Siad's own admission, had promised
to provide military assistance to Somalia.
On 23 July 1977, Somalia unleashed on the African
Horn an armed conflict. Under cover of the Front for the Liberation
of Western Somalia (FLWS)--which had been created by the Somali leadership
itself--it sent its own forces into the Ogaden, and they occupied a significant
part of the Ethiopian provinces of Harar, Bale, and Sidamo, and only through
the bitter fights which unfolded in October-December 1977 were they stopped
at the approaches to the important centers of Harar and Dire Dawa.
After appropriate preparation, the Ethiopian armed
forces went on the counter-attack in February of this year. In the beginning
of March of this year the strategically important city of Jijiga was liberated,
and a major grouping of Somali forces was shattered. Cuban military
personnel took part in the military actions, while Soviet military advisors
participated in working out the plan of military operations. To the
present, the liberation of all territory has in fact been completed, and Ethiopian
troops have reached the border with Somalia. When the Somalis were on
the edge of a military catastrophe, the leadership of the SDR made the decision
to withdraw its forces from the Ogaden front. At the same time the representatives
of the FLWS announced that they would not stop military actions on the territory
of the Ogaden.
Confronted with the decisive refusal of the Soviet
Union and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth to support the
territorial claims on Ethiopia, the Somali leadership on 13 November 1977
unilaterally announced the annulment of the 1974 Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation and demanded the recall from Somalia of all Soviet military
and civilian advisors. In Somalia an anti-Soviet campaign was unfolded.
Diplomatic relations with Cuba were cut off.
At the same time the Somali leadership began actively
to search for support from Muslim states, winning from them assistance which
included arms deliveries and the sending of forces for participation in combat
actions against Ethiopia under the banner of "Islamic Solidarity."
The visit of the President of Somalia, Said Barre, to Iran, Pakistan, Egypt,
Sudan, Oman, and also Iraq and Syria, at the end of December 1977-beginning
of January 1978, served just such goals.
As the conflict went on, the Somali leaders many
times called out to the USA and other Western powers with persistent appeals
to provide assistance to Somalia and to interfere in events on the African
Horn aimed at a "peace" settlement to the conflict and the "defense"
of Somalia from aggression which allegedly was being prepared against it from
the direction of Ethiopia.
Following the collapse of its adventure in Ogaden,
Somalia has not retracted its territorial claims against Ethiopia, and putting
forth various conditions it continues to seek these same goals by other means.
The Somali leadership called on the great powers with an appeal to secure
recognition and the realization of self-determination for the population of
the Ogaden. In this regard it called on the great powers to undertake
urgent measure to settle the conflict through negotiations, and by securing
the withdrawal of "all foreign forces" from the African Horn, having
in mind the Cuban military personnel and Soviet military advisors which had
been invited by the Ethiopian government as a means to strengthen the defense
capability of the country. Somalia also spoke out for sending "neutral
forces" to the Ogaden.
The Ethiopian leadership evaluated the actions
of Somalia as an act of armed aggression and in relation to this on 8 September
1977 broke off diplomatic relations with the SDR.
During the armed conflict, the PMAC expressed readiness
to settle the conflict peacefully within the framework of the OAU, putting
forth as an absolute condition the beginning of negotiations with the Somalis
on the withdrawal of their forces from Ethiopian territory. Simultaneously
the Ethiopian leaders declared many times in public speeches that Ethiopia
did not intend, after the liberation of the Ogaden territory, to carry military
actions beyond the limits of their own borders.
After the destruction of the Somali troops, the
Ethiopia MFA asserted in its declaration on 12 March of this year the aspiration
of the Ethiopian government to establish peace and stability on the African
Horn in accord with the Charters and decisions of the U.N. and the OAU, on
the basis of observation of the principles of non-use of force as a means
of solving international arguments, and non-interference in the domestic affairs
of other states. In the declaration it was further pointed out that
the establishment of peace on the African Horn is possible only in the event
of Somali retraction of its claims for part of the territory of Ethiopia and
Kenya, and also Djibouti, [and] observation by it of international agreements.
In it are rejected the attempts of the USA government and its allies to tie
the withdrawal of Somali forces to a resolution of issues which fall under
the sovereignty of Ethiopia (the presence on its territory of foreign military
personnel invited there by the Ethiopian government, the proposal to send
foreign observors to the Ogaden).
Regarding Somalia's demand that the population
of the Ogaden be presented with the right of self-determination, the Ethiopian
leadership declares that a resolution of that issue is a domestic affair of
Ethiopia and that therefore it cannot be a condition for a settlement of the
Somalia-Ethiopia conflict. The Ethiopian side also raises the issue
of compensation from Somalia for the losses caused by the military actions
in the Ogaden.
Somalia's position in the conflict with Ethiopia
does not meet, as a rule, with support from the members of the OAU, who support
the preservation of existing state borders in Africa.
The special committee of the OAU for settlement
of Somalia-Ethiopia relations (under the chairmanship of Nigeria), which met
in session in Libreville [Gabon] in August 1977, refused to accept the Front
for the Liberation of Western Somalia as a national-liberation movernment,
[and] called on the governments of both countries to stop hostile actions
and to settle their disagreements by peaceful means, on the basis of the principle
of the inviolability of the borders of African countries. In a resolution
accepted by the the committee there was contained a call on everyone, particulary
non-African countries, to refrain from interference in the conflict.
Efforts which have until now been undertaken by
several African countries and the OAU to mediate an end to the conflict have
not led to any positive results in view of the contradictory positions taken
by the sides.
Over the course of the conflict, the reactionary
Muslim regimes have taken a position in support of Somalia. However,
according to information which we have, at the time of the conduct of military
actions in the Ogaden, President Siad was not successful in getting their
agreement to send their forces to that region, although Saudi Arabia, Iran,
Pakistan, and Egypt did covertly send arms to Somalia.
On the other hand, such Arab countries as the PDRY,
Algeria, and, to an extent, Libya, provided support to Ethiopia. In
this regard the PDRY sent weapons and military personnel to Ethiopia.
Over the course of the conflict, Sudan's position
underwent change. For a variety of reasons it refused to take an extreme
anti-Ethiopian course.
Leading Western countries, while verbally supporting
a political settlement to the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict and stressing their
own neutrality, in fact have tried to use the conflict to undermine the revolutionary
regime in Ethiopia and to rout the progressive forces in Somalia, and also
to weaken the presence of the USSR in that region of the world. In fact,
the Westerners have conducted a policy of veiled assistance to Somalia.
Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons they have not set out to provide Somalia
with direct military assistance. Primarily they did not want to decisively
push Ethiopia away from them, counting on reestablishing their positions here
in the future. They also could not but take into account that the actions
of Somalia had not met with support from African states, but [in fact] Kenya,
which has tight contacts with the West, sharply condemned them.
At the present time, from the side of the Westerners,
particularly the USA, efforts are being undertaken to take into their own
hands the initiative for a settlement of the conflict in the interests of
strengthening their own positions on the African Horn. Under conditions
of the occupation of the Ogaden by Somali forces they put forth proposals
for a quick beginning to negotiations, so that the Somali side could speak
at them from a position of strength. Another of their ideas which they
put forth was to pass consideration of the issue of the conflict to the UN
Security Council, where the Westerners counted on putting pressure on Ethiopia.
The decision of the SDR to withdraw Somali forces
from the Ogaden was quickly used by the USA leadership for a declaration about
the need for the quick withdrawal from Ethiopia of Soviet and Cuban military
personnel. The Western powers also spoke in favor of the idea of sending
to the Ogaden foreign "neutral observers" to supervise the withdrawal
of troops from that regions and to ensure the security of its population.
The Chinese leadership has expressed itself from
an anti-Soviet position in relation to the conflict, trying to heap all the
responsibility for the ongoing events on the Soviet Union. While not
openly expressing its attitude to the conflict, at the same time it has essentially
supported the position of Somalia. There is information that the PRC
has delivered small arms to Somalia.
The countries of the socialist commonwealth have
in relation to the conflict taken a position of censuring the aggressive actions
of Somalia and providing Ethiopia with internationalist assistance and support.
Cuba acted particularly actively in this direction,
sending, in response to a request from the government of Ethiopia and as officially
announced by F. Castro on 16 March of this year, its own tank operators, artillery
specialists, pilots, and also sub-units of mechanized infantry, to provide
assistance to the armed forces of that country while the Ogaden was under
conditions of occupation by Somali forces. During the Ethiopian counter-attack,
Cuban solders were used in the main lines of attack. The Soviet Union
and Cuba are in constant contact aimed at coordination of their actions in
support of the Ethiopian revolution.
The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Somali-Ethiopia
conflict is determined by the fact that that conflict contradicts the interests
of progressive forces in that region, and creates a danger of turning the
African Horn into a hotbed of serious international tension.
After the outbreak of armed conflict on the African
Horn, the Soviet Union came out in favor of its quick cessation, for the peaceful
settlement of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia by means of negotiations
on the basis of mutual respect by the sides of sovereignty, territorial integrity,
inviolability of borders and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs,
noting that an absolute condition of such a settlement must be a cessation
of military actions and a quick and unconditional withdrawal of Somali forces
from the territory of Ethiopia, and that otherwise a situation analagous to
the one in the Middle East might arise on the African Horn.
Our principled line in relation to the situation
on the Horn of Africa was precisely expressed in the speeches of comrades
L.I. Brezhnev of 28 September 1977 on the occasion of the visit to the USSR
of the President of the People's Republic of Angola A. Neto, and A.N. Kosygin
of 12 January 1978 on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of the President
of the APDR [Algerian People's Democratic Republic] H. Boumedienne, and also
in the TASS Declaration of 18 January 1978.
The Soviet Union spoke out against efforts of the
Western states to submit the issue of the situation on the African Horn for
consideration by the UN Security Council, which they could use in particular
to unleash a hostile campaign against the USSR and Cuba. At the same
time the Soviet Union believes that the Organization of African Unity should
continue its efforts to provide assistance on a settlement of the Somali-Ethiopia
conflict, insofar as it has not exhaused its possibilities in this area.
The position of the Soviet Union towards the Somali-Ethiopia
conflict has many times been brought to the attention of the leadership of
progressive African and Arab states, and also to a range of Western powers.
The Soviet Union consistently follows a firm line
in providing the utmost assistance and support to the revolutionary Ethiopian
regime. During the conflict, supplementary, urgent measures were undertaken
to strengthen the defense capability of Ethiopia, which had become a victim
of aggression. We brought deliveries of combat materiel, weapons, and
ammunition to Somalia to a halt. After the Somali side undertook unfriendly
actions in November 1977, the Soviet Union stopped economic and trade cooperation
and ended military cooperation with Somalia.
In the beginning of March of this year President
Said appealed to the Soviet Union with a request to provide mediatory services
to settle the Somali-Ethiopia conflict and expressed readiness to establish
friendly relations between Somalia and the USSR.
From our side agreement was given to implement
mediatory efforts if the leadership of Ethiopia would view that favorably
and in the event that Somalia took a realistic position on a settlement of
the conflict. In this regard Siad's attention was drawn to the fact
that the various preconditions put forth by the Somali side (giving self-determination
to the population of Ogaden) only delay the possibility of holding negotiations
to bring an end to the conflict, insofar as they cannot be acceptable to any
sovereign state and complicate the realization by us of mediatory efforts.
As far as the establishment of friendly relations
with Somalia is concerned, from our side there was expressed readiness for
that in principle and under the clear understanding of the fact that Somalia
will take specific steps to establish a genuine peace on the African Horn.
In response to our information about Siad's proposal,
the Ethiopian government, having expressed doubt about the sincerity of the
intentions of the Somali leadership, at the same time expressed readiness
to begin negotiations with Somalia in Moscow with the participation of the
Soviet Union, on the condition that the Somali representatives are prepared
to declare in due course the rejection of their anti-Ethiopian, anti-Soviet,
and anti-Cuban positions; to declare respect for the territorial integrity
of Ethiopia and to give agreement to the demarcation of the Ethiopia-Somalia
border on the basis of existing international agreements; to stop their support
of underground movements directed against the territorial integrity and unity
of Ethiopia; and lastly, in some way or another to inform public opinion of
their own country and world public opinion about Somalia's new position.
So far the Somali leadership rejects these proposals
and continues to insist on its own conditions.
The outcome of the war in the Ogaden essentially
was reflected in the domestic political situation of its participants.
The situation in Somalia was sharply exacerbated. On the grounds of
a worsening of the economic situation and a decline in the standard of living,
dissatisfaction with the current leadership grew among various strata of the
population, including the army. This dissatisfaction, which has assumed
open forms, is being suppressed by Said with the help of executions and repressions.
In Ethiopia the military victory facilitated, on the one hand, the consolidation
of the patriotic, progressive forces, and the strengthening of the position
of Mengistu and his supporters, and, on the other hand, enlivened nationalistic
elements, including in the leadership of the country, which are putting forth
the idea that the Somali threat should be "done away with" once
and for all.
Overall, the situation on the African Horn remains
complex and tense. The cessation of military actions on the ground has
not yet been ratified in any way, and the continuing Somali claims to the
Ogaden, and [to] part of the territory of Kenya and the Republic of Djibouti,
create a situation fraught with the outbreak of a new armed confrontation.
Such a situation creates an opportunity for maneuvers of imperialist and reactionary
Arab circles in this region of Africa, and therefore the establishment there
of peace and the achievement of an agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia
on stopping the conflict corresponds to our interests.
Third
African Department
MFA
USSR
[Source:
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll. 13-23; translated by Mark Doctoroff.]
