Russian
& East German Documents on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, 1977-78
SED
Memorandum of a Conversation with Comrade [Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Anatoly
P.] Ratanov in Addis Ababa, 13 March 1978
On 13 March 1978, [GDR diplomat] Eberhard Heinrich
met with the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia, Comrade Ratanov, for an two-hour
conversation.
[Other participants; opening remarks]
On the attitude towards Somalia, Comrade Ratanov
explained that they had informed Mengistu on 7 March about Siad Barre's offer
of negotiations. Mengistu promised to have this immediately discussed within
the PMAC. He said that it would not be bad if Somalia could be brought back
into the Socialist camp regardless of the government in that country.
One had to make efforts to tear Somalia away from
the imperialists and certainly there were positive forces influencing Siad
Barre. Perhaps he has also acknowledged some mistakes.
The discussion within the PMAC was apparently difficult,
and there was no response the next day. On 9 March, the Cuban comrades approached
Mengistu with a message from Fidel Castro which contained similar recommendations.
On 13 March, Ratanov met again with Mengistu and then received the written
response of the Ethiopian leadership. (For a translation see appendix [not
printed--ed.]). Comrade Ratanov said, in the conversation in which [Maj.]
Berhanu Bayeh [Chairman of the legal and administrative affairs committee
and of the special commission on Eritea] participated, that it was right to
demand guarantees from Somalia and that it had to refrain from its territorial
demands. At the same time it was necessary to employ the correct political
tactics. We lose nothing if we agree to negotiations. One cannot demand everything
in advance. This would practically mean to call for political suicide. After
all Siad Barre wants to save his skin. Moreover, the Ethiopian positions could
not well be presented as logical before world public opinion. At first Ethiopia
declares that it would be willing to negotiate if Somalia withdraws its troops.
Now that they [the Somalis] are willing to do so, the Ethiopians are retreating
from their position. This attitude could well be a gift for the imperialists
because Siad Barre can claim that Ethiopia was not willing to negotiate and
instead was preparing for new attacks in pursuit of its goals. After consultation
with Mengistu, the Soviet Union responded to Siad Barre in the following way:
Ethiopia is willing to enter into negotiations with Somalia with the Soviet
Union participating. It will be expected from Somalia to declare its readiness
in the course of the negotiations to abandon its anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban,
and anti-Ethiopian position. Somalia had to prove by its actions before domestic
and world public opinion that it is indeed assuming a really new position.
Under such conditions Ethiopia is willing to develop comprehensive cooperation
between both countries.
On the Eritrean question, Comrade Ratanov stated
that the development in Somalia was not the only thing complicating the situation.
There are people within the Ethiopian leadership who, based on different positions,
act in immature, arrogant, and nationalistic ways.
In a conversation, Comrade Mengistu indicated that
the Socialist countries, to his mind, did not really understand the Eritrean
problem. It was not a national but a class problem. He referred especially
to an interview given by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a member of the politburo
of the CP Cuba, to an English journalist on 12 February. In this interview,
Rodriguez indicated in response to a corresponding question that the Eritrean
problem had to be dealt with differently than the other questions in Ethiopia.
It was concluded that the Eritrean problem was a domestic Eritrean [sic-Ethiopian?--ed.]
problem.
Mengistu thought that this statement had practically
given the separatists a guarantee.
The Cuban comrades have declared that Comrade Rodriguez
should not be interpreted in this way.
The movements in Eritrea which are directed against
the Ethiopian Revolution are objectively counter-revolutionary. There are,
however, national factors which have to be acknowledged. The Arab countries
are trying to separate Eritrea from Ethiopia and to make it a member of the
Arab League. This would mean that Ethiopia would be cut off from the Red Sea.
Mengistu has to understand that we fully understand this and also the dangers
evolving from the nationalist and separatist Eritrean movements. One has to
anticipate the plans of the imperialists and the reaction. It is correct that
the movements have lost much of their national character but there remain
genuinely national forces. It is correct that Eritrea is not a nation but
this also applies to other African countries. In proceeding towards a solution
in the Eritrean problem, we should distance ourselves from the separatists.
Mengistu is so far not willing to call for progressive
action in Eritrea and to work together with the progressive forces. To him,
Eritrea is exclusively an Ethiopian matter. He favors a continuation of military
actions in order to bring under his control in particular the centers and
the road to Massawa.
Currently there is a process of differentiation
taking place among the Eritrean movements and forces are appearing which are
interested in a unification with the revolutionary Ethiopian forces.
The Ethiopian troops in Eritrea are now tired of
fighting, and even the victory of the Ogaden has not changed much. Despite
the success, no significant units can be withdrawn from there and a fast change
in the military situation in Eritrea is not to be expected.
On the development of the Party, Mengistu has promised
that a group of Soviet advisers could arrive at any time. There have been
a number of delays in this question. Mengistu apparently has no concept of
the cooperation with the advisers. It is necessary to convince him that the
advisers could be a real help and relief. [...]
[Source:
SAPMO-BA, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian
F. Ostermann.]
