Russian
& East German Documents on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, 1977-78
Embassy
of the GDR in the USSR, Political Department, 17 February 1978, Memorandum
of Conversation with the Dep. Head of the MFA Third Department (Africa), Comrade
S. J. Sinitsin, 16 February 1978
[...] Comrade Sinitsin gave his estimate of the
situation in Ethiopia and on the Horn of Africa.
1. The counteroffensive of the Ethiopian armed
forces against the Somali troops in the Ogaden is considered positive. We
are currently not dealing with a general offensive but the recovery of important
strategic points which will then allow for the complete expulsion of Somali
military from Ethiopian territory. So far, a 30 km to 70 km deep zone has
been recovered. The air superiority of the Ethiopian forces has a great impact.
Comrade Sinitsin considered the prospect for a successful conclusion of the
fighting for the Ethiopians rather good; he also emphasized, however, that
military encounters will intensify. Such factors as the general mobilization
in Somalia and increased arms deliveries by the West will have some effect.
Also, one cannot forget the fact that significant parts of the Ethiopian armed
forces have to be kept in the North and are involved in fighting counterrevolutionary
groups in Eritrea. Another part of the army is necessary to guarantee security
towards the Sudan. The Ethiopian army can still not be considered a homogeneous
unit. Large parts of the cadres, in particular the officer corps, were taken
over from the imperial government. Sabotage, insubordination, even withdrawal
without fighting are serious occurrences. Great attention is therefore paid
to the reorganization of the army and the concerted build-up of a popular
militia. The biggest problem here is once again the cadres and their training.
One should also not underestimate the problems caused by the change-over in
the army from Western to Socialist weapons systems which have to be managed
and deployed efficiently.
Finally, a number of problems with regard to the
revolutionary development in Ethiopia need to be solved. The situation in
the countryside is characterized by a heightening of class warfare. In contrast
to other developing countries with a Socialist orientation, there is a strong
social differentiation in Ethiopia and the implementation of class principle
requires permanent relentless struggle. Although the necessity of an avant-garde
party has evolved, there are currently no grounds for such a party. [...]
Although there have evolved political groups at a local level which in the
future could lay the foundations for a party, there exist a number of sectarian
groups which at times exert large influence.
Simultaneously with the problem of building up
a unified political organization with a broad popular basis, the question
arises with regard to a state apparatus which is loyal to the new leadership.
Army and state apparatus - both taken over from imperial times - still are
divided in two camps. Many decisions taken by the revolutionary military leadership
are already sabotaged within the government, even in the defense and foreign
ministry. The enemies of the people's forces enjoy the full support of Western
countries. Since there is a lack of trained progressive cadres, no radical
solution can be pursued. All these factors point to the conclusion that a
long developmental stage will be necessary to solve the basic problems in
favor of a Socialist Revolution in Ethiopia.
2. The international situation of the conflict
at the Horn of Africa is characterized by the efforts of the imperialist countries
to keep a crisis atmosphere on the African continent in order to achieve their
long-term objectives. These plans are bound to fail with the increasing progress
towards a military solution of the conflict in favor of Ethiopia. Western
counter-efforts can clearly be recognized. Although the Barre regime is embarrassing
to the Western powers, they are using it as a tool in their attempt to pursue
their interests.
They use the lie of alleged aggressive designs
on Ethiopia's part in order to conceal their direct activities in support
of Somalia. The declaration of Western powers that they would not make weapons
available to Somalia is refuted by arms deliveries via third, in particular
reactionary Arab countries and via "private" firms. Simultaneously,
the Western countries are increasing their politico-diplomatic pressure for
the "independence" of the Ogaden to at least achieve a partial success
which would improve the prospects for the realization of their long-term goals.
From this point of view we have to understand the
willingness of the Western powers to attain an armistice without the withdrawal
of Somali troops from Ethiopian territory. It is their goal to give Somalia
the opportunity to consolidate its position on Ethiopian territory and to
achieve, through protracted negotiations, a situation like the one in the
Middle East. Therefore the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries fully
support the basic Ethiopian position: armistice, withdrawal of Somali troops,
and political negotiations.
The direct and indirect [Western] support for Somalia
illustrates the demagogic character of the declarations of the Western governments,
which shows itself in the comparison of Somalia with Ethiopia, the comparison
of an aggressor with its victim, and the attempt to blame the Soviet Union
and the Socialist countries for the heightening of the conflict and thus to
keep them from further supporting Ethiopia. The Ethiopian leadership is carefully
observing the attitude and actions of the imperialist states and differentiates
between them. In this respect one has to view Mengistu's declaration announcing
to the United States, Great Britain, and the FRG that he would break diplomatic
relations if they continued their direct support of Somalia. Hence he is clearly
considering with subtle difference states such as Italy, which as a former
colonial power is currently taking on a flexible position in Ethiopia, and
France, which is above all interested in the consolidation of its position
in Djibouti.
3. The conflict in the Horn of Africa has led to
a strong polarization and differentiation among the African and the Middle
Eastern countries. The situation in Ethiopia is made more difficult
by the encirclement by reactionary regimes of states which depend upon them.
While South Yemen is altogether taking a positive position on Ethiopia, the
other, even many progressive, Arab nations, have considerable reservations
about supporting Ethiopia. In particular, the Arab nations differ in their
attitude towards Eritrea which ranges from open solidarity to direct support
of the separatists in Eritrea. Reservations are also held against Libya and
Algiers who do not even support the revolutionary development in Ethiopia
to a full measure. Differences of opinion also exist between Syria and Iraq
on the one hand, and Ethiopia on the other hand.
While the OAU has continued to defend, in the framework
of its own decisions and in full agreement with Ethiopia, the integrity of
Ethiopian borders, one has to differentiate the attitude of individual African
countries toward the conflict.
The countries of Black Africa fully support the
Ethiopian position. But the unanimous condemnation of Somalia as an aggressor
was not achieved. Thus, just as a number of member states of the OAU repudiated
the clear condemnation of the aggression against Angola, they also differ
in their position in the evaluation of the situation on the Horn of Africa.
One can also not overlook such influences as that exerted by Nigeria which
favors the independence of the Ogaden.
In general, the Soviet comrades acknowledge the
positive fact that the OAU will continue its activities for a settlement of
the conflict. This fact is also especially important because some powers continue
to pursue attempts for a settlement of the conflict by the UN Security Council.
Like Ethiopia, the Soviet Union is against an intervention by the Security
Council since this would promote the internationalization of the conflict
as intended by the Western countries. One should also remember that a takeover
by the Security Council would delay a resolution of the conflict - in a similar
fashion as the Middle East conflict - to an uncertain point in the future.
Furthermore, a UN involvement would lead to a great power confrontation [and]
would aggravate the situation within the UN which would have a negative effect
upon the main problems now confronting the UN.
Although a treatment of the conflict has so far
not been put before the Security Council by the Western powers, it cannot
be precluded that such attempts will be undertaken. One thing is clear, they
would have an anti-Soviet impetus.
With regard to Beijing's attitude towards the conflict
between Somalia and Ethiopia, one can detect - as has been exposed in Soviet
publications and mass media - a clearly hostile attitude against the Ethiopian
leadership. Beijing supports, as all over the world, reactionary regimes inasmuch
as this serves anti-Sovietism. Although China openly shares Somalia's point
of view, its direct material support is altogether rather moderate. Besides
direct arms deliveries, Beijing is supporting Somalia in the construction
of roads and irrigation systems and delivers medical aid.
Existing pro-Maoist groups in Ethiopia exert very
little influence and have no broad popular basis.
4. With regard to the demand by Somalia to recall
its students in the USSR, Comrade Sinitsin informed us about the following:
Upon request of the Somali government, the Somali embassy in Moscow delivered
a note to the MFA in Moscow communicating the intention to recall all Somalis
residing in the USSR. The Soviet Union was asked to help with the return of
the students which is to be carried out on special planes. The MFA of the
USSR responded by arguing that the recall of students in ongoing training
programs would be a violation of existing agreements and thus the financial
burden had to be carried by Somalia.
The students' return aboard special planes itself
was not refused. [...]
[Signed:
Vogel]
[Source:
SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; obtained and translated by Christian F.
Ostermann.]
