Russian
& East German Documents on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, 1977-78
Third
African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Information Report on Somali-Ethiopian
Territorial Disputes, 2 February 1977
SOMALIA'S
TERRITORIAL DISAGREEMENTS WITH ETHIOPIA AND THE POSITION OF THE USSR - (Brief
Information Sheet)
Somalia claims a significant part of Ethiopian
territory (the Ogaden region) on the basis of the fact that a large number
of Somalis live there (around 1 million people).
Ethiopia totally rejects the territorial claims
of the SDR, basing its position on the fact that the borders with Somalia
were set by international agreements, particularly the Agreement on the demilitarization
of the Ethiopia-Somalia border, which was signed in 1908 between Ethiopia
and Italy. They also refer to the resolution of the OAU which
was accepted in Cairo in 1964, which says that all African states must recognize
the borders which existed at the moment when they were granted independence.
The tension in relations with Somalia led imperial
Ethiopia to draw close to Kenya (the Somalis did not decline either from demanding
the unification with Somalia of the Northern border region of Kenya, which
is populated by Somalis) on an anti-Somali basis. In 1963 there was
a Treaty on joint defense signed between the two countries.
At the beginning of 1964 a direct military confrontation
broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia, although the conflict was soon settled
through the mediation of the OAU. The Soviet government also called
on both sides with an appeal to quickly cease fire and to resolve all disputed
issues in a peaceful way.
During 1970-71 a series of Ethiopia-Somalia negotiations
were conducted which ended without result. At the end of 1972-beginning
of 1973 a series of border incidents broke out (in the regions of Washen,
Bongol, Dolo, and others) which were smoothed over by peaceful means.
The tension in relations between Ethiopia and Somalia
many times attracted the attention of the Organization of African Unity.
However, efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution to the territorial
argument between Ethiopia and Somalia within the framework of the OAU so far
have yielded no result.
At the session of the OAU Assembly which took place
in Addis Ababa in January 1976, two meetings took place, at Siad Barre's initiative,
between him and the chairman of the PMAC of Ethiopia, during which the question
of bilateral relations was raised. The leaders of both countries asserted
that the exchange of opinions was productive, and expressed the intention
to continue the dialogue. Practical steps in this direction, however,
were not undertaken.
The Somali leaders, though they stress that the
issue must be resolved by peaceful means, as in the past do not repudiate
the demand about the unification of the Ogaden with Somalia. According
to available information, the Somalis continue their activity in the Ogaden,
throwing their armed detachments in there under the command of line officers.
The new Ethiopian leadership, refusing to discuss
the territorial issue, expresses readiness to conduct negotiations on the
demilitarization of the existing border and speaks out in favor of the development
of economic, cultural, and other relations with the SDR.
Relations between the two countries are becoming
more complex also because of Djibouti - a French territory of Afars and Issa
(FTAI), to which France intends to grant independence this year. For
Ethiopia this territory represents a vital interest in view of the fact that
Djibouti is the terminus of the railway from Addis Ababa, by way of which
the basic part of Ethiopia's foreign trade freight is carried. The Somalis,
for their part, consider the FTAI, or, as they call that territory, "French
Somalia," one of five parts of "Greater Somalia," in view of
the fact that its population to a significant extent consists of tribes which
are related to the Somalis.
At the XXX session of the UN GA, a resolution was
accepted in which was asserted the unconditional right of the people of Djibouti
to quick and unconditional independence, and also contained an appeal to all
states to "desist from any claims whatever on that territory and declare
null and void any actions in support of such claims." Both Ethiopia
and Somalia voted for that resolution.
At the same time the government of the SDR does
not hide its hopes that once having become independent the population of Djibouti
will come out in favor of unification with Somalia. This was displayed,
in particular, at the XIII Assembly of the OAU (July 1976), where the Somali
representatives did not support the demand of Ethiopia for a joint declaration
to repudiate territorial claims, asserting that the sovereignty of Djibouti
should not depend on "threats of police actions from the power-guarantors."
In December 1976, President Siad, in a communication to the heads of African
states, declared even more precisely that "if the goal of these guarantees
will force Somalia to reject our blood ties, the common history and culture
which tie us with the people of Djibouti, then we declare, that is impossible."
Nonetheless, Somalia, just like Ethiopia, voted
for the resolution of the XXXI session of the UN GA of 23 November 1976,
on Djibouti, which once again affirmed the right of the people of that territory
to independence. Representatives of both countries to the UN declared that
their governments will recognize, respect, and observe the independence, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity of Djibouti after it receives independence.
However, in the course of the discussion at the
UN General Assembly session, the speeches of the Somalia and Ethiopia delegations
showed that, as in the past, serious disagreements remain between these countries
about the ways to resolve the Djibouti problem. They showed particularly
on the issue of the return to the territory of political refugees. The
Ethiopians accused the Somalis of intending to send to Djibouti their own
citizens, disguised as refugees, so as to ensure as a consequence its joining
with the SDR.
The position of the Somali leadership regarding
Eritrea also leaves a negative imprint on Somalia-Ethiopia relations.
Providing support to Eritrean separatists, Somalia, to all appearances, is
counting on the fact that the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia will lead
to a split of the multinational Ethiopian state, which will facilitate the
unification of the Ogaden territory with Somalia.
The Somali government recently has activated its
propaganda against Ethiopia and its activity in the international arena, with
the goal of enlisting support for its position vis-a-vis the new Ethiopian
regime, which, as it believes, is conducting in relation to Somalis the former
imperial "colonial policy." This point of view was expressed
by the vice president of the SDR [Gen. Mohamed Ali] Samantar during his visit
last year to a number of European socialist countries and to Cuba. However,
in no instance did it meet with understanding. Somalia is also taking
certain steps in Arab countries so as to receive support for its claims to
Ogaden and Djibouti. In this regard the Somalis point to the fact that
the joining of Djibouti to the "Arab world" (SDR is a member of
the Arab League) promises it not insignificant benefits in realizing plans
to turn the Red Sea into an "Arab lake."
Arab reaction supports and heats up the aspirations
of the Somalis, with the goal of putting pressure on the progressive Ethiopian
leadership. President of Somalia Siad intends in the beginning of 1977
to complete a trip to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan
and several other Arab countries. As he left in January 1977 for Khartoum
to prepare for this visit, Member of the Politburo of the CC of the Somali
Revolutionary Socialist Party [Ahmed] Suleiman [Abdullah] public expressed
himself in vulgar anti-Ethiopian thrusts. Suleiman openly spoke out
in support of the Eritrean separatists, and also in favor of a proposal to
move the headquarters of the OAU from Addis Ababa to another capital, a proposal
for which Sudan and several African countries with a pro-Western orientation
recently expressed support.
Beginning in the 1960s, in almost every instance
of a serious aggravation of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, Ethiopia and Somalia
have appealed to the Soviet government with a request to assert influence
on the government of the other country with the goal of normalizing the situation.
Recently, both Somalia and Ethiopia have repeatedly called for more active
participation by the Soviet Union in settling their bilateral relations.
In this regard each of them is counting on the Soviet Union to support precisely
their position, using for this its authority and friendly relations with the
opposing side.
In January 1976, Siad Barre informed the Soviet
government of [Somalia's] intention to enter into negotiations with the Ethiopian
leadership about the creation of a Federation of Somalia and Ethiopia.
In this regard the President requested the Soviet side to join the negotiations
as a mediator. Insofar as the goal and character of a federation, as
well as the possible position of Ethiopia, were not clear, it was decided
to avoid defining our attitude to this initiative and mediation on this issue.
In November 1976 Siad Barre expressed the wish that the Soviet side would
report to the Ethiopian leadership about the wish of the SDR to begin a peaceful
dialogue with Ethiopia on the disputed issues which they have. This
wish was brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Committee of the
PMAC for political and foreign affairs through the Soviet Embassy in Addis
Ababa.
At the end of 1976 the Cubans and South Yemenis
came out with an initiative to provide mediatory services towards a settlement
of Somalia-Ethiopia relations. The Somali government, not rejecting
this proposal, spoke out in favor of the Soviet Union as well participating
directly in the mediation. The Ethiopian side, regarding the mediation
initiative favorably, did not express an analogous wish. Cuba and the
PDRY through diplomatic channels are taking certain steps to organize meetings
between the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia.
The position of the Soviet Union on the question
of the Ethiopia-Somalia territorial dispute, which many times has been brought
to the attention of the governments of both countries, is that Ethiopia and
the SDR must take all possible measures to settle their disagreements by means
of negotiations and to find a way to lessen the tension in Ethiopia-Somalia
relations.
The friendly advice of the USSR government, aimed
at a settlement of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, has been favorably accepted
by the governments of both countries. In responses to our appeals both
Ethiopia and Somalia have announced their readiness to resolve all disputed
issues by means of negotiations and not to allow the unleashing of a new armed
conflict.
Third
African Department
MFA
USSR
[Source:
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1632, ll. 39-44; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff;
note revisions to this document added in late May-early June, printed below.]
Additions
to 2 February 1977 Report by Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry,
on "Somalia's Territorial Disagreements with Ethiopia and the Position
of the USSR," apparently in late May-early June 1977
[...] On 16 March 1977, a meeting took place in
Aden between President Siad and PMAC Chairman Mengistu with the participation
of Fidel Castro and the Chairman of the Presidential Council of South Yemen,
Rubayi-i-Ali.
Mengistu appealed to Siad for the coordination
of actions to rebuff imperialist and reactionary forces which simultaneously
threaten both Ethiopia and Somalia. Siad held to an intransigent position,
putting forth the annexation of the Ogaden to Somalia as an immutable condition
for normalizing Somali-Ethiopian relations. He demanded that the issue
of the transfer of the Ogaden to Somalia be quickly resolved, with the subsequent
formation of a federation between Somalia and Ethiopia. At the meeting
Siad declared that if the socialist countries would not support Somalia on
the territorial issue, then he would be required to appeal to Arab and Western
states for assistance.
The representative of South Yemen put forward a
proposal to create a committee made up of high-ranking representatives of
Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and Cuba for resolution of disputed Somali-Ethiopian
issues. Siad refused to work in that committee. However, until
now that proposal remains in force.
[...]
At a meeting of the Chairman of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet, N.V. Podgorny, with Siad Barre which took place at
the beginning of April of this year during his brief visit to Somalia, Siad
expressed readiness to continue the search for a mutually acceptable formula
for resolving the problems facing Ethiopia and Somalia and requested the Soviet
Union to provide help in organizing a meeting with Mengistu.
At Soviet-Ethiopian negotiations which took place
during the official visit to the Soviet Union of the official Ethiopian delegation
headed by the Chairman of the PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam during 4-8 May 1977,
the Ethiopian side was informed of N.V. Podgorny's recent conversation with
Siad Barre. In accord with the wish of President Siad, we proposed to
Mengistu that through our good offices we organize and conduct in the Soviet
Union a summit meeting for the establishment of good-neighborly relations
between Somalia and Ethiopia. Mengistu accepted that suggestion with
satisfaction and expressed agreement with the thoughts that had been expressed
to him in this regard. However, in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador
on 17 May of this year, President Siad declared that he is not ready at the
present time to sit at the negotiating table with Mengistu. [...]
[Source:
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1619, ll. 61-68; translated by Paul Henze.]
Report
from CPSU CC to SED CC, Information about the Visit to the Soviet Union of
Somalia Vice President Samanta, late May-early June 1977
Strictly
Confidential
[notation:
"EH 6.6.77"]
I
N F O R M A T I O N
on
the visit of the First Vice-President of Somalia Mohammad Ali Samantar to
the Soviet Union in the end of May-early June
At first Samantar was in Moscow unofficially, then at joint agreement
it was decided to publicize the fact of his presence in the Soviet Union.
Samantar held conversations with the CC CPSU Politburo member,
Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and the alternate member of the CC
CPSU Politburo, CC CPSU Secretary B.N. Ponomarev. Upon conclusion of these
talks Samantar was received by General Secretary of the CC CPSU L.I. Brezhnev.
They discussed on a principled level the main directions of the Soviet-Somali
relations and reaffirmed a political line of the USSR and the SDR, aimed at
the development of cooperation between them in various fields.
In the course of conversations in Moscow, aside from the issues
of the Soviet-Somalian relations, a major focus was on the issues connected
to the situation in the area of the African Horn, on which [issues] our side
laid out the position that is well known also to the Ethiopian leadership.
Soviet-Ethiopian relations, for understandable reasons, took a special place
in the conversations.
Samantar concentrated his attention on the disagreements between
Somalia and Ethopia on the territorial question. In justifying the positions
of the SDR he mentioned the well-known Somalian arguments. Samantar did not
dispute the revolutionary character of the regime of Ethiopia, as the
Somalis have done before. Yet he hinted that not everything is normal in the
domestic situation in Ethiopia, that the rights of the persons of Somalian
extraction who live in Ogaden are still allegedly impinged upon. Samantar
said that the leadership of Ethiopia, instead of turning to persuasion as
the main tool of bringing the population [of Ogaden] over to its side, all
too often resorts to arms.
Our side repeatedly underscored the idea that the main thing
now is to avoid military confrontation between Somalia and Ethiopia. We drew
[his] attention to the perversity of a situation when two states - Somalia
and Ethiopia - who set themselves on the path of revolutionary development
are at loggerheads. Of course, we know about the differences of opinion between
Somalia and Ethiopia, first of all on the territorial issue. But if a war
breaks out between them, only imperialist forces would gain from this. Such
a war not only would lead to grave consequences, it would also turn against
Somalia and would allow reactionary forces to put a noose around its neck.
L.I. Brezhnev stressed in this regard that one should not allow
a military confrontation to flare up between the two progressive states of
Africa, and that all issues and disputes between them should be resolved in
a peaceful way, at the negotiation table.
As to the domestic situation in Ethiopia, we declared it was
not our business to discuss such issues. The Ethiopians themselves should
resolve them.
In our opinion, there were two important points that surfaced
in the course of the discusions.
First. If earlier we had the impression that the Somali leadership
vacillated with regard to a meeting with the leadership of Ethiopia and to
a mission of good-will on the part of the Soviet Union in the organization
of such a meeting, now Samantar declared that the Somalis are ready for this.
In response to our direct question when and on which level the
Somalian side would expect to hold such a meeting, he said that any time would
be good for them, but did not mention any dates. In Samantar's opinion, at
first there could be a ministerial meeting, and a final stage could be held
as a summit. At the same time, Samantar let us understand that before the
organization of such a meeting we should define a range of issues for discussion,
by emphasizing that for the Somalis in the focus is still the territorial
issue. Concerning the participation of Soviet representatives in a meeting,
Samantar did not define their level, did not say that it [the level] should
be high.
Second. Of great importance is Samantar's declaration that the
Somali leadership would not on its own initiative unleash an armed conflict
with Ethiopia. He said it twice during his meetings with A.A. Gromyko and
B.N. Ponomarev. He made a similar pronouncement in his conversation with L.I.
Brezhnev.
True, Samantar spoke about a scenario of provocation of such
a conflict on the part of external imperialist forces or their helpers. To
this we reacted in the following way: if such forces were around, then both
sides, Somalia and Ethiopia, should not respond to such a provocation, but
should display state wisdom and vigilance.
On the whole, the visit of Samantar to Moscow was, in our opinion,
usful. It shows that the leadership of Somalia does not drop the idea to begin,
with assistance of the Soviet Union, a dialogue with the leaders of Ethiopia
in order to normalize relations between the two countries.
[Source:
SAPMO, J IV 2/202 584; obtained and translated from Russian by V. Zubok.]
