Russian
& East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-78
Memorandum
of Conversation between Soviet Counselor-Minister in Ethiopia S. Sinitsin
with Political Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia
Herbert Malin, 2 February 1977
From
the diary of SECRET, Copy No. 2
S.Y.
Sinitsin
4 February 1977
Ser.
No. 41
NOTES
OF CONFERENCE with Advisor for Political Issues
of
USA Embassy in Ethiopia HERBERT MALIN, 2 February 1977
I met today with Malin in the USA Embassy by preliminary
arangement. The following points of interest were discussed.
Concerning the situation in Ethiopia, Malin noted
the tension of the situation caused by the activation of forces opposed to
the Derg, especially in the northwestern region of the country which is siding
with the Sudan. He directed attention to the "harsh pronouncements"
of the Chairman of the PMAC, Teferi Banti, of January 29 and 30 of this year,
addressed to the leaders of the Sudan and Somalia, who are pursuing an anti-Ethiopian
policy, as well as to his call for a union of "all progressive and patriotic
forces" for the defense of "the revolution and the fatherland,"
in this connection not mentioning the anti-government leftist organization
"Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party" (EPRP). However,
Malin feels that the EPRP will hardly agree to support the call of Teferi
Banti, due to its disagreement with the policy of the Derg.
At the same time, he continued, the opposition
forces are not united and their joint opposition to the existing regime has
a temporary and tactical character. Even if the opposition forces should
succeed in overthrowing this regime, a struggle for power will erupt between
them, especially between the pro-monarchy "Ethiopian Democratic Union"
and the "Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party" and other leftist
groups. The PMAC, in his opinion, continues to be the only real common
national power in contemporary Ethiopia, although its policy does not enjoy
support among a significant portion of the population. It is further
undoubted that, despite the declarations of the Sudanese and Somalis, present
day Ethiopia does not harbor "aggressive designs" in relation to
its neighbors, and in any event lacks the opportunity for the same in view
of its complex internal problems.
Concerning circumstances in the Military Council
itself, after the implementation of its partial reorganization in the end
of December [1976] with the aim of reinforcing "collective leadership"
of the country, the opinion predominates in Addis Ababa that the policy of
the PMAC will acquire a "more moderate" character. However,
to judge by the declarations of Teferi Banti, that has not occurred.
In sum, according to Malin's opinion, circumstances
in Ethiopia will continue to be complicated and tense for a long time to come.
For his part, he noted that the deterioration of
existing circumstances in the country is tied in significant part to the open
interference in the internal affairs of Ethiopia by the community of Arab
countries and other forces, who are aligned in hostility to the policy of
the PMAC and are supporting forces opposed to it. He noted further that,
in the final analysis, what is at issue is not merely Ethiopia itself, but
the situation in the region as a whole, the efforts of certain Arab circles
to establish complete control over the Red Sea, which constitutes an important
international maritime route, and the possible eruption here of a completely
tense situation and even armed conflict. In this connection the opinion
of Malin on the condition of American-Ethiopian relations and prospective
development of circumstances in the given region was of interest.
Malin said that until now the American administration,
owing to the presidential elections, had not had an opportunity to involve
itself to the extent warranted in the development of its policy in this region.
Since the change of regime in Ethiopia in 1974, American-Ethiopian relations
have had a relatively complex and contentious character. The USA cannot
ignore the periodic outbreaks of anti-American activity in the country.
Thus, on 27-28 January of this year, in the course of anti-government demonstrations
by young protesters in Addis Ababa, glass was broken and gas bombs were hurled
at the department of the USIS [United States Information Service] building,
in addition to which leaflets of the "Ethiopian People's Revolutionary
Party" were distributed. Similar bombs were hurled at the building
of the MAAG [American Military Advisory Group]. In the course of a demonstration
of by a group organized by the Military Council on 3 January in Addis Ababa
in connection with the above-noted pronouncements of Teferi Banti, anti-American
performances by an array of orators were also seen, along with anti-American
placards and so forth, although official declarations, including those by
Teferi Banti himself, contained no such direct anti-American missives.
At the same time, Malin continued, the Ethiopian
government displays an interest in continuing to receive various forms of
assistance from the USA, especially military assistance, and frequently talks
about the timetable for the delivery of military supplies and so forth.
Prior to the change of regime in Ethiopia, American military assistance was
at an annual level of 10-12 million American dollars and was administered
preferentially on an uncompensated basis (deliveries of arms, ammunition,
spare parts, etc.). In recent years, owing to the new policy of the USA in
the area of military cooperation with foreign governments, American military
assistance to Ethiopia has been granted preferentially on commercial terms,
and it includes several types of more advanced armaments, in connection with
which the value of the assistance has grown. Thus, the signing of a
multi-year contract in 1975 envisions the supply of armaments, spare parts
and ammunition in the approximate sum of 250 million American dollars.
Already in 1976 the USA supplied Ethiopia with part of those arms, including
several "Phantom" fighter planes. This year a supply of several
additional fighter planes is contemplated, as well as supplies for the Ethiopian
navy, and radar defenses.
Malin noted further that the new Ethiopian administration
is pursuing a policy of seeking methods of receiving military assistance from
other sources as well, possibly on terms more advantages to it, including
from the USSR (he is aware of the visit by the Ethiopian military delegation
to Moscow in December of 1976), as well as the PRC [People's Republic of China],
although he doubts that the Chinese are capable of supplying Ethiopia with
"serious armaments."
The USA, Malin emphasized, does not oppose the
"socialist choice" of new Ethiopia and, as before, firmly supports
the principal of respect for its territorial integrity, and is against the
partition of Ethiopia. The USA, it is understood, is interested in the
guarantee of stability in that region and freedom of navigation in the Red
Sea.
Responding to pertinent questions, he said that
the American-Ethiopian agreement of 1953 "on mutual security guarantees"
concerned the preferential supply of assistance by the USA to the armed forces
of Ethiopia and the guarantee of "certain American interests," first
and foremost of which was the operation of the "center of communications"
in Asmara, which was of great importance at the time (that center has now
been curtailed in significant part); but, as he understands it, [the agreement]
does not call for the direct involvement of American armed forces in the defense
of Ethiopia's security, for example, in the case of aggression against it
or a threat to its territorial integrity.
Concerning the present deterioration in Ethiopian-Somali
relations, as far as Malin knows, the USA has not undertaken any diplomatic
steps toward its normalization or restraint of anti-Ethiopian actions by the
Arab countries, and in fact the Ethiopian government itself has not raised
the issue with the USA.
One of the potential sources for an eruption of
a conflict in that region, in Malin's opinion, is the independence of Djibouti
that has emerged this year, inasmuch as a serious disagreement exists between
Somalia and Ethiopia regarding the future policy of Djibouti. In recent
months, the Somalis have succeeded in reinforcing their political influence
in Djibouti, and their ties with its present leaders, which has seriously
worried the Ethiopians. It is evident, as well, that after its declaration
of independence, Djibouti will enter the League of Arab Nations, both in political
and economic respects, inasmuch as the position of Djibouti will be complicated
following the departure of the French. An array of Arab nations has
already established consulates there. The USA also intends to do this
prior to the declaration of independence, having requested appropriate permission
from the government of France.
In the course of the discussion, Malin expressed
interest in the state of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, having come upon rumors
concerning the upcoming visit to the USSR of First Deputy Chairman of the
PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam, and also in connection with the negative, as he
understands it, attitude of Somalia toward the prospective development of
Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation.
I told Malin that our traditionally friendly relations
with Ethiopia have a tendency to develop further, as evident from the joint
Soviet-Ethiopian communique of 14 July 1976, resulting from the visit to Moscow
of an Ethiopian state delegation; the growth of Soviet technical assistance
to Ethiopia (teachers in the University, doctors, etc.); the work here during
the second half of last year by Soviet economic experts, and so forth.
It was pointed out that the continuation of contacts between the two countries
at a high level would be the natural procedure under such conditions, although,
however, that question had not come up in respect to a concrete plan.
I said further that we are aware of the disagreements between Somalia and
Ethiopia, and that our unwavering position in that connection is to serve
as a motivation for both countries to move towards a peaceful resolution of
these disagreements at the negotiating table, in order to prevent a deterioration
of circumstances in this region. This relates as well to our position
in connection with the current complication in Sudanese-Ethiopian relations.
As concerns the future of developments in Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation, it
is understood that this cannot be directed against Somalia, with whom we are
also developing friendly relations, as the Somali leadership is well aware.
Malin asked, in my opinion, in what spheres would
the interests of the USA in Ethiopia not be counter to the interests of the
Soviet Union.
I replied, that in my view, these spheres would
first and foremost encompass the conduct of a policy of respect for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Ethiopia; noninterference in its internal affairs;
a realistic approach to the social-economic and political transformations
taking place in the country by the will of the people; the building of peace
and security and a halt to the growth of tensions and conflicts between the
countries of that region; and adherence to the principle of unrestricted navigation
in the Red Sea, in accordance with recognized standards of international law
and the interests of peaceful relations in general.
Thanking me for the conference, Malin expressed
a desire for continuation of further contacts and exchanges of opinions regarding
the questions discussed, as to which, for his part, he stated his agreement.
COUNSELOR-MINISTER
TO THE USSR EMBASSY IN ETHIOPIA
/s/
S. SINITSIN
[Source:
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll. 28-33; translated by Bruce McDonald.]
Third
African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Information Report on Somali-Ethiopian
Territorial Disputes, 2 February 1977
SOMALIA'S
TERRITORIAL
DISAGREEMENTS
WITH ETHIOPIA AND THE POSITION OF THE USSR
(Brief
Information Sheet)
Somalia claims a significant part of Ethiopian
territory (the Ogaden region) on the basis of the fact that a large number
of Somalis live there (around 1 million people).
Ethiopia totally rejects the territorial claims
of the SDR, basing its position on the fact that the borders with Somalia
were set by international agreements, particularly the Agreement on the demilitarization
of the Ethiopia-Somalia border, which was signed in 1908 between Ethiopia
and Italy. They also refer to the resolution of the OAU which
was accepted in Cairo in 1964, which says that all African states must recognize
the borders which existed at the moment when they were granted independence.
The tension in relations with Somalia led imperial
Ethiopia to draw close to Kenya (the Somalis did not decline either from demanding
the unification with Somalia of the Northern border region of Kenya, which
is populated by Somalis) on an anti-Somali basis. In 1963 there was
a Treaty on joint defense signed between the two countries.
At the beginning of 1964 a direct military confrontation
broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia, although the conflict was soon settled
through the mediation of the OAU. The Soviet government also called
on both sides with an appeal to quickly cease fire and to resolve all disputed
issues in a peaceful way.
During 1970-71 a series of Ethiopia-Somalia negotiations
were conducted which ended without result. At the end of 1972-beginning
of 1973 a series of border incidents broke out (in the regions of Washen,
Bongol, Dolo, and others) which were smoothed over by peaceful means.
The tension in relations between Ethiopia and Somalia
many times attracted the attention of the Organization of African Unity.
However, efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution to the territorial
argument between Ethiopia and Somalia within the framework of the OAU so far
have yielded no result.
At the session of the OAU Assembly which took place
in Addis Ababa in January 1976, two meetings took place, at Siad Barre's initiative,
between him and the chairman of the PMAC of Ethiopia, during which the question
of bilateral relations was raised. The leaders of both countries asserted
that the exchange of opinions was productive, and expressed the intention
to continue the dialogue. Practical steps in this direction, however,
were not undertaken.
The Somali leaders, though they stress that the
issue must be resolved by peaceful means, as in the past do not repudiate
the demand about the unification of the Ogaden with Somalia. According
to available information, the Somalis continue their activity in the Ogaden,
throwing their armed detachments in there under the command of line officers.
The new Ethiopian leadership, refusing to discuss
the territorial issue, expresses readiness to conduct negotiations on the
demilitarization of the existing border and speaks out in favor of the development
of economic, cultural, and other relations with the SDR.
Relations between the two countries are becoming
more complex also because of Djibouti - a French territory of Afars and Issa
(FTAI), to which France intends to grant independence this year. For
Ethiopia this territory represents a vital interest in view of the fact that
Djibouti is the terminus of the railway from Addis Ababa, by way of which
the basic part of Ethiopia's foreign trade freight is carried. The Somalis,
for their part, consider the FTAI, or, as they call that territory, "French
Somalia," one of five parts of "Greater Somalia," in view of
the fact that its population to a significant extent consists of tribes which
are related to the Somalis.
At the XXX session of the UN GA, a resolution was
accepted in which was asserted the unconditional right of the people of Djibouti
to quick and unconditional independence, and also contained an appeal to all
states to "desist from any claims whatever on that territory and declare
null and void any actions in support of such claims." Both Ethiopia
and Somalia voted for that resolution.
At the same time the government of the SDR does
not hide its hopes that once having become independent the population of Djibouti
will come out in favor of unification with Somalia. This was displayed,
in particular, at the XIII Assembly of the OAU (July 1976), where the Somali
representatives did not support the demand of Ethiopia for a joint declaration
to repudiate territorial claims, asserting that the sovereignty of Djibouti
should not depend on "threats of police actions from the power-guarantors."
In December 1976, President Siad, in a communication to the heads of African
states, declared even more precisely that "if the goal of these guarantees
will force Somalia to reject our blood ties, the common history and culture
which tie us with the people of Djibouti, then we declare, that is impossible."
Nonetheless, Somalia, just like Ethiopia, voted
for the resolution of the XXXI session of the UN GA of 23 November 1976,
on Djibouti, which once again affirmed the right of the people of that territory
to independence. Representatives of both countries to the UN declared that
their governments will recognize, respect, and observe the independence, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity of Djibouti after it receives independence.
However, in the course of the discussion at the
UN General Assembly session, the speeches of the Somalia and Ethiopia delegations
showed that, as in the past, serious disagreements remain between these countries
about the ways to resolve the Djibouti problem. They showed particularly
on the issue of the return to the territory of political refugees. The
Ethiopians accused the Somalis of intending to send to Djibouti their own
citizens, disguised as refugees, so as to ensure as a consequence its joining
with the SDR.
The position of the Somali leadership regarding
Eritrea also leaves a negative imprint on Somalia-Ethiopia relations.
Providing support to Eritrean separatists, Somalia, to all appearances, is
counting on the fact that the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia will lead
to a split of the multinational Ethiopian state, which will facilitate the
unification of the Ogaden territory with Somalia.
The Somali government recently has activated its
propaganda against Ethiopia and its activity in the international arena, with
the goal of enlisting support for its position vis-a-vis the new Ethiopian
regime, which, as it believes, is conducting in relation to Somalis the former
imperial "colonial policy." This point of view was expressed
by the vice president of the SDR [Gen. Mohamed Ali] Samantar during his visit
last year to a number of European socialist countries and to Cuba. However,
in no instance did it meet with understanding. Somalia is also taking
certain steps in Arab countries so as to receive support for its claims to
Ogaden and Djibouti. In this regard the Somalis point to the fact that
the joining of Djibouti to the "Arab world" (SDR is a member of
the Arab League) promises it not insignificant benefits in realizing plans
to turn the Red Sea into an "Arab lake."
Arab reaction supports and heats up the aspirations
of the Somalis, with the goal of putting pressure on the progressive Ethiopian
leadership. President of Somalia Siad intends in the beginning of 1977
to complete a trip to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan
and several other Arab countries. As he left in January 1977 for Khartoum
to prepare for this visit, Member of the Politburo of the CC of the Somali
Revolutionary Socialist Party [Ahmed] Suleiman [Abdullah] public expressed
himself in vulgar anti-Ethiopian thrusts. Suleiman openly spoke out
in support of the Eritrean separatists, and also in favor of a proposal to
move the headquarters of the OAU from Addis Ababa to another capital, a proposal
for which Sudan and several African countries with a pro-Western orientation
recently expressed support.
Beginning in the 1960s, in almost every instance
of a serious aggravation of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, Ethiopia and Somalia
have appealed to the Soviet government with a request to assert influence
on the government of the other country with the goal of normalizing the situation.
Recently, both Somalia and Ethiopia have repeatedly called for more active
participation by the Soviet Union in settling their bilateral relations.
In this regard each of them is counting on the Soviet Union to support precisely
their position, using for this its authority and friendly relations with the
opposing side.
In January 1976, Siad Barre informed the Soviet
government of [Somalia's] intention to enter into negotiations with the Ethiopian
leadership about the creation of a Federation of Somalia and Ethiopia.
In this regard the President requested the Soviet side to join the negotiations
as a mediator. Insofar as the goal and character of a federation, as
well as the possible position of Ethiopia, were not clear, it was decided
to avoid defining our attitude to this initiative and mediation on this issue.
In November 1976 Siad Barre expressed the wish that the Soviet side would
report to the Ethiopian leadership about the wish of the SDR to begin a peaceful
dialogue with Ethiopia on the disputed issues which they have. This
wish was brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Committee of the
PMAC for political and foreign affairs through the Soviet Embassy in Addis
Ababa.
At the end of 1976 the Cubans and South Yemenis
came out with an initiative to provide mediatory services towards a settlement
of Somalia-Ethiopia relations. The Somali government, not rejecting
this proposal, spoke out in favor of the Soviet Union as well participating
directly in the mediation. The Ethiopian side, regarding the mediation
initiative favorably, did not express an analogous wish. Cuba and the
PDRY through diplomatic channels are taking certain steps to organize meetings
between the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia.
The position of the Soviet Union on the question
of the Ethiopia-Somalia territorial dispute, which many times has been brought
to the attention of the governments of both countries, is that Ethiopia and
the SDR must take all possible measures to settle their disagreements by means
of negotiations and to find a way to lessen the tension in Ethiopia-Somalia
relations.
The friendly advice of the USSR government, aimed
at a settlement of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, has been favorably accepted
by the governments of both countries. In responses to our appeals both
Ethiopia and Somalia have announced their readiness to resolve all disputed
issues by means of negotiations and not to allow the unleashing of a new armed
conflict.
Third
African Department
MFA
USSR
[Source:
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1632, ll. 39-44; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff;
note revisions to this document added in late May-early June, printed below.]
Memorandum
of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador in Ethiopia
A.P.
Ratanov and Cuban Ambassador in Ethiopia Jose Peres Novoa,
10 February 1977
TOP
SECRET, Copy No. 2
From
the diary of "30" March
1977 RATANOV, A.P.
Issue No. 129
RECORD
OF CONVERSATION
With
the Ambassador of Cuba in Ethiopia JOSE PERES NOVOA
10
February 1977
During a conversation which took place in the Soviet
Embassy, Jose Peres Novoa reported that on 8 February he had visited Mengistu
Haile Mariam at the latter's request.
Mengistu requested that the Ambassador pass on
to Fidel Castro a verbal message in which the PMAC requests Cuba to provide
assistance to the Ethiopian People's Militia via deliveries of small arms.
In this regard Mengistu declared that the Americans had already refused to
provide spare parts for tanks, [and] had suspended deliveries of spare parts
for all kinds of weapons, and that the PMAC expects the USA, after the events
of 3 February to apply even harsher sanctions against Ethiopia. At the same
time the USA is providing military assistance to Sudan, [and] Kenya, and is
encouraging officials of the these and other countries to act against the
Ethiopian regime.
The PMAC, reported Mengistu, intends to follow
Cuba's example of creating in factories and agencies, and in villages, committees
for defense of the revolution, which will act in close contact with detachments
of the people's militia, which are formed under the supervision of urban and
rural associations. However, the effectiveness of these measures will
depend on whether the PMAC has available and at its disposal the necessary
quantity of weapons.
USSR
AMBASSADOR IN ETHIOPIA
/s/
A. RATANOV
[Source:
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, l. 85; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff.]
Soviet
Embassy in East Germany, Report for CPSU CC Summarizing Visit to Somalia on
31 January-1 February 1977 by Delegation of the GDR Socialist Unity Party
(SED) CC, 18 February 1977
USSR
EMBASSY IN
GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
SECRET,
Copy no. 1
18
February 1977
TO
THE SECRETARY OF THE
CC CPSU comrade B. N. PONOMAREV
We send to your attention according to classified
procedures this report concerning the trip to Somalia, Mozambique, and Ethiopia
(January 31 - February 11 of this year) by a delegation from the German Democratic
Republic, headed by Politburo member, Secretary of the CC SED, comrade W.
Lamberz.
ATTACHMENT:
above-mentioned document of 41 pages, secret.
USSR
AMBASSADOR TO
GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
/s/
P. ABRASIMOV
[attachment]
SECRET,
Copy no. 1
Attachment
to no. 122
18
February 1977
Translated
from German
REPORT
concerning a trip to the Democratic Republic of Somali by a delegation from
the CC SED from
31
January-1 February 1977
From 31 January to 1 February a delegation from
the CC SED, headed by Politburo member, Secretary of the CC, Werner Lamberz
visited Mogadishu at the invitation of the leadership of the Somali Revolutionary
Socialist Party (SRSP). The delegation comprised: CC Member Kurt Tidke,
Candidate-Member of the CC Eberhard Heidrich, Deputy Chief of the CC Section
Freidel Trappen.
In accordance with its instructions, the delegation
conveyed from the Secretary General of the CC SED Erich Honecker to the Secretary
General of the SRSP and to the President of the Democratic Republic of Somalia,
Mohammed Siad Barre, a message in response to the letter from Barre dated
24 November 1976, and concluded an agreement on collaboration between the
SED and the SRSP for 1977-78.
The delegation received Mohammed Siad Barre, with
whom they engaged in a detailed discussion.
Werner Lamberz conveyed greetings from the Secretary
General of the CC SED and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, Eric Honecker,
and conveyed some explanations regarding his message. At the same time
he stated the SED position with regard to the progressive development in Somalia
and reported on the decisions of our party leadership, which were made as
a result of the discussions of comrade [GDR Vice President Willi] Stoph in
Somalia with comrade Samantar in the GDR. It was declared that the SED
will now and in the future, to the extent of its abilities, offer support
to the Republic of Somalia. At the same time, particular attention was
drawn to the concurrence of the party.
Mohammed Siad Barre expressed his thanks for the
message from Eric Honecker and expressed his gratitude for the GDR's manifestation
of solidarity with the anti-imperialist liberation struggle. Somalia
considers the help, which has been offered by the SSNM brigade in the preparation
of specialists, to be particularly useful. Siad Barre in detail elucidated
the internal situation in Somalia and, at the same time, particularly underscored
the difficulties in realizing the party program.
In connection with the statement by Werner Lamberz
concerning relations between the SDR and Ethiopia, Barre first and foremost
affirmed the necessity of reaching a peaceful settlement of the problem with
Ethiopia. However, at the same time, it was notable that his position
on this question was contradictory and not free of nationalist features.
He expressed doubt about the revolutionary nature of development in Ethiopia
and characterized the Ethiopian leaders as chauvinists, and as connected to
Zionist forces. Progressive forces in Ethiopia, including Marxist-Leninists,
are persecuted and destroyed.
In the course of further conversation, in particular
after the statement setting forth our position regarding the necessity of
reaching agreement between progressive forces in Somalia and Ethiopia, and
of the inadmissibility of any possibility that the imperialists should profit
from the discord between the two states, Barre declared that he was prepared
to study seriously any proposition of the Ethiopian leadership, in particular,
from Mengistu. (Attachment 1). [not printed--ed.] (During the meeting between
members of the Somali party and state leadership and the delegation, at which
ambassadors of the socialist countries were also present, the Soviet ambassador
to Mogadishu informed me that at the end of January [1977] comrade Brezhnev
had likewise sent a message to Siad Barre, containing an urgent request that
Barre reconsider the Somali position with regard to Ethiopia and that they
avoid any exacerbation of the conflict.)
During the discussion of the project for a party
agreement proposed by the SED, at first clarity was achieved with regard to
the notion that the central content of such an agreement should be cooperation
in the political-ideological area and that cooperation between our parties
comprises the nucleus of all relations between our states and peoples.
However, the SRSP delegation, headed by Politburo Member Ahmed Suleiman Abdullah,
came forward with a request which greatly exceeds the ability of the SED (to
build five fully equipped regional Party schools, to equip 82 regional Party
committees with radio technology and supply with typographical machines, to
accept an exceedingly large number of students for study at SED institutes
of higher education, etc.), with which it was not possible to agree.
In spite of these unrealistic requests, we succeeded in concluding an agreement
which is realistic and which represents significant assistance and support
for the Somali Party (Attachment II).[not printed--ed.]
It was strikingly apparent that, both during the
time when our delegation toured around the city and during the negotiations
on a Party agreement, mention was made repeatedly of the assistance and support
which Somalia receives from China.
According to various [sources of] information,
apart from a strongly progressive core in the Somali leadership, there is
also a pro-China force which leans to the side of reactionary Arab states.
(Last year Somalia was accepted into the Arab League as its youngest member.)
/s/
comr. R. A. Ulianovskii
[Source:
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 77, d. 1618, ll. 1-5.]
Memorandum
of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Somalia G.V. Samsonov and Somali
President Siad Barre, 23 February 1977
EMBASSY
OF THE USSR IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA
From
the journal of Secret. Copy No. 2
G.V.
SAMSONOV Orig. No. 101
11
March 1977
NOTES
FROM CONVERSATION
with
President of the Democratic Republic of Somalia
MOHAMMED
SIAD BARRE
23 February 1977
Today I was received by President Siad.
In accordance with my orders I informed him about
the considerations of the Soviet leaders, and Comrade Brezhnev personally,
concerning the situation developing around Ethiopia.
The President thanked me for the information. Then
he pointed out that certain people in the SDR, encouraged from abroad, speculated
that Soviet cooperation with Ethiopia was allegedly carried out to the detriment
of Soviet-Somali relations. According to Siad, he had to condemn such a point
of view in his speech at the Khalan Military School in particular, he had
to say that such statements should be considered anti-Somali propaganda aimed
at subversion of the Somali revolution. The President emphasized that the
assistance that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries provide for
the Ethiopian revolution was not only justified, but also necessary. The Soviet
Union, as we understand it, the President said, is trying to help Ethiopia
stabilize on the road of socialist orientation, and those goals of the Soviet
Union completely coincide with Somali interests. The SDR has an interest in
having a socialist, not a capitalist, neighbor.
Characterizing Chairman of the PMAC H.M. Mengistu,
President Siad called him a firm and consistent proponent of the progressive
change in Ethiopia. However, according to Siad, Mengistu does not abide by
Leninist principles in the nationality issue. He must give the nations living
in Ogaden, including both the Eritreans and the Somalis, the right to self-determination.
According to the President, it is important that Mengistu resolves the territorial
problem right now, or at least gives assurances that he is ready to consider
this question positively in the future. Siad alleged that the struggle for
power in the Ethiopian leadership was still going on, and that there were
no positive changes in the state apparatus of that country. The President
thinks that Mengistu is unwilling to meet with him. He mentioned the fact
that the Chairman of the PMAC did not give an immediate response to the [Tanzania
President Julius] Nyerere letter, which was delivered to Addis Ababa by Vice
President [Aboud] Jumbe of Tanzania, and in which, according to Siad, the
idea of his meeting with Mengistu was put forth.
Responding to the Soviet remarks concerning statements
of certain Somali statesmen in Sudan, President Siad alleged that member of
the Politburo CC SRSP Suleiman had only expressed an opinion on the situation
in Ethiopia, and that Minister of Public Health Rabile God was just giving
his personal views, and that his statement was, allegedly, provoked by the
Sudanese. The main threat to Ethiopia was arising from Sudan, Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Kenya, not from the SDR, emphasized the President. According to
a reliable source, Siad said, the internal reaction, represented by the Ethiopian
Democratic Union headquartered in London and supported by the CIA, was carefully
preparing a broad terrorist campaign against the leadership of the PMAC and
against other progressive Ethiopian leaders. Siad denied the information that
special units trained in the Somali territory, which also included Somali
servicemen, were being transferred to the Ogaden. The SDR was not going to
start a war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden, stressed the President. Such a
conflict would be detrimental to both countries. Only imperialists and the
Arab reactionaries would win in such a case. We understand this very well,
said Siad. However, we will support the struggle for unification with the
Fatherland of the Somalis living in the Ogaden, emphasized the President.
He said that the people living in the Ogaden were their brothers and sisters,
and that his leadership could not reject them if they appeal to them for help.
The people of Somalia would not understand its leaders if they were to suppress
their struggle for liberation from the Ethiopian colonial yoke.
I explained to Siad the CPSU policy on the nationality
issue.
Responding to my question concerning Somali-American
contacts, the President told me about his meeting with USA representative
at the UN [Andrew] Young in Zanzibar in early February 1977. He mentioned
that the meeting was held at the American initiative. According to Siad, Young
informed him about the "new approach" of the Carter Administration
in their policy toward Africa, and stressed the USA readiness to cooperate
with all African countries. Siad Barre said to Young that the peoples of Africa
will judge the "new" American policy by the practical actions of
the American administration. First of all, the United States must withdraw
its support for the white minority regimes in South Africa. Responding to
Young's question, why the SDR was always acting from an anti-American position,
Siad said that it was the United States that was always conducting a vicious
anti-Somali policy. The SDR decisively condemned the USA position on the Middle
East, and also the support that the USA gave to various reactionary forces
in their struggle against progressive regimes, and the fomenting of military
conflicts in various regions of the globe.
The President told me that recently a representative
of the USA State Department visited Mogadishu, arriving from Khartoum. He
had a meeting with General Director Abdurrahman Jama Barre of the MFA of the
SDR. The American requested to have meetings with several Somali state leaders
of his choice, including First Vice President Samantar. His request was denied.
According to the President, the American left the SDR dissatisfied.
Touching upon his initiative for cooperation between
the USSR and the SDR, the President repeated the suggestion he made earlier
(17 January 1977) that the Soviet Union take on the development of the lands
of the Fanole project. According to the President, Somalia had neither the
necessary experts, nor technology, nor resources, and that it would be incorrect
to invite other countries to carry out those tasks. Siad said that the provision
about development of those lands had not been included in the original agreement
on Fanole project construction only because of the incompetence of the Somali
representatives who signed that document.
The President also reminded me of his request concerning
construction of a naval base in the region of Mogadishu, and also of docks
in Berbera and Kismayu, which was stated in the memorandum delivered to Moscow
by First Vice President Samantar. Those projects are still in force and the
Somali leadership is expecting the Soviet government to examine them favorably.
Speaking about the military airfield in Berbera
which had been opened recently, Siad said that it had been built without taking
into account the prospects of its possible civilian utilization. This airfield
should serve not only the interests of the USSR, but the interests of the
SDR also. In order for this airfield to be used by civil aviation in the future,
it would be necessary additionally to build a control tower for air traffic
controllers, a room for transit passengers, other necessary services of a
modern airport, and also a hotel for 200-300 rooms in the city, in which the
Soviet air crews and naval crews could also stay. Those additional constructions
would serve as a kind of cover for the military airfield.
Having given a high evaluation of the Soviet assistance
in the organization of fishing cooperatives, President Siad made a request
that the Soviet side provide resources in the form of commodity credits to
cover the local expenses in those cooperatives, since the SDR was experiencing
shortages not only of material, but also of financial resources for those
projects. Specifically, the Somali leadership was asking the Soviet Union
to take responsibility for providing the minimum living standard for the families
of transfer workers in the cooperatives, and to apportion up to 10 shillings
per worker per day, mentioned the President. According to the President, he
gave directives to certain Somali organizations to prepare official requests
on the questions just mentioned.
President Siad expressed his warm gratitude to
the CC CPSU for the decision to provide assistance in construction of the
party school at the Central Committee of the SRSP. He said he considered that
assistance a show of fraternal care from the CPSU for the SRSP which
was undergoing a difficult formative period. He also thanked Moscow for the
attention to the request for more Somali citizens, especially for people from
Djibouti, to be given an opportunity to study in the Soviet Union, and for
the decision to satisfy the request in the 1977-78 academic year.
AMBASSADOR
OF THE USSR
IN THE SDR /G. SAMSONOV/
[Source:
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1621, ll. 10-14; translation by S. Savranskaya.]
Memorandum
of Conversation between Soviet Acting Charge d'affaires in Ethiopia S. Sinitsin
and Ethiopian official Maj. Berhanu Bayeh,
18 March 1977
TOP
SECRET Copy No. 2
From
the journal of 30 March 1977
SINITSIN,
S.Ia.
Issue No. 124
RECORD
OF CONVERSATION
with
the member of the Permanent Committee of the PMAC
Major
BERHANU BAYEH
18
March 1977
This evening I visited Berhanu Bayeh in the office
of the PMAC at his request.
Referring to an instruction of the leadership of
the PMAC, he informed me for transmission to Moscow of the following.
I. The meeting in Aden which took place March 16
between Mengistu Haile Mariam and Siad Barre, with the participation of [Cuban
President] Fidel Castro and [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen President]
Rubayi [Ali], ended without result in view of the position which Siad Barre
took at the meeting.
As Berhanu Bayeh said, the President of the SDR
in arrogant terms expressed Somalia's territorial claims against Ethiopia,
called Ethiopia a "colonial power," and declared that Somalia will
continue its current policy in relation to Ethiopia, "while all Somalians
have not received freedom." Siad Barre displayed disrespect to
Mengistu Haile Mariam, crudely saying that that he allegedly is carrying out
the same policy as had Haile Selassie. The Somali leader also declared
that if Ethiopia considers itself a socialist state, then it must rapidly
transfer the Ogaden to the SDR. As the basis of a settlement of the
Ethiopian-Somali disagreement, Siad Barre suggested the creation of a confederation
of the two countries on an "ethnic basis," i.e., with the preliminary
transfer by Ethiopia of the Ogaden to Somalia's benefit. This proposal
was rejected not only by Mengistu Haile Mariam, but Fidel Castro and Rubayi
also expressed themselves against such an approach, which served as grounds
for disrespectful statements to them by Siad Barre.
In the words of Berhanu Bayeh, in the course of
the meeting Siad Barre declared that if the socialist countries want to split
with Somalia, that is their affair: the Somalian people carried out
its revolution without outside help and "if the socialist countries will
not help the Somalis, then reactionary countries can help them."
At the meeting Mengistu Haile Mariam stressed the
necessity of a consolidation of progressive forces in this region so as to
oppose jointly the maneuvers of reaction and imperialism. In this regard,
he underlined that no genuine revolution can successfully develop without
the support of other progressive, especially socialist, states.
Despite such results of the meeting, Berhanu Bayeh
said, the Ethiopian leadership believes that the meeting brought an indisputable
diplomatic success to Ethiopia, insofar as it visibly and in the presence
of the leaders of Cuba and the PDRY revealed the true position of Somalia
not only towards Ethiopia, but also in regard to the general tasks of the
struggle with imperialism and reaction. In the opinion of Berhanu Bayeh,
which, he said, is expressed also by the Cuban comrades, Siad Barre had taken
such an uncompromising position at the meeting with Mengistu Haile Mariam,
that he apparently had previously secured promises of support from reactionary
Arab states.
2. In the evaluation of the leadership of the PMAC,
Berhanu Bayeh continued, in light of the results of the Aden meeting it is
possible to assume a sharp activization of anti-Ethiopia activity by Somalia
in close cooperation with reactionary Arab states. According to information
which the PMAC received from Mogadishu, the President of Sudan [Ja'afar Mohammed
al-]Nimeiry should arrive in Somalia in a few days. In this regard the
PMAC pointed to a report in the Egyptian newspaper "Al Ahram" to
the effect that in current conditions the possibility is created that Somalia
with join the political command of Sudan, Egypt, and Syria. It is also
well known, said Berhanu Bayeh, that Saudi Arabia is continuing to seek an
end to Somalia's cooperation with the Soviet Union, including in the military
area, promising in exchange to provide Somalia with the necessary assistance.
The leadership of the PMAC also is on guard about
the intensified infiltration in the Ogaden by Somali armed groups, which moreover
now include regular Somali troops disguised in civilian dress, armed with
modern weapons. This, observed Berhanu Bayeh, has determined the extremely
stubborn nature of recent armed conflict in the regions of Harar and Jijiga,
as a result of which the Somalis managed to put out of action several armored
vehicles of the Ethiopian Army. On 17 March, a Somali Air Force MiG
fighter plane completed a provocative flight over Ethiopian territory in the
region of Jijiga.
In light of all this, Berhanu Bayeh reguested that
a PMAC request be sent to the Soviet government to take all possible measures
to restrain Somalia from anti-Ethiopia actions. The PMAC does not exclude
the possibility that Somalia at the present time may be preparing a serious
armed provocation against Ethiopia, and therefore would be grateful for any
information about that which it could receive from the Soviet side.
From my own side I pointed out to Berhanu Bayeh
the need in this situation for Ethiopia to display fortitude. Further,
I underlined the principled line of the Soviet Union of all-round support
for the Ethiopian revolution and our diplomatic steps in this regard which
were taken recently in states which border on Ethiopia.
Berhanu Bayeh said that Ethiopia does not intend
to aggravate its relations with Somalia or to toughen its own position.
With satisfaction he noted the support of the Soviet Union for the Ethiopian
revolution, particularly underlining the significance of the early deliveries
of Soviet arms.
In the words of Berhanu Bayeh, at the present time
the PMAC is confronted with the critical issue of the uninterrupted supply
to the Ethiopian Army of ammunition and spare parts for weapons which it possesses.
The Americans are procrastinating on previously-agreed deliveries, and also
deliveries of weapons on a commercial basis, referring in this regard to a
required review of certain contracts in view of an increase in prices for
these or some other types of weapons. The leadership of the PMAC, as
in the past, is counting on the Soviet Union to provide Ethiopia with the
necessary varied military assistance, but it understands that time will be
required to master Soviet military equipment. Therefore, the PMAC is
now urgently seeking out the possibility of receiving weapons, ammunition,
and spare parts of American manufacture, insofar as the Ethiopian Army for
now is armed by the USA.
To this end, said Berhanu Bayeh, the PMAC in the
coming days will send its own delegation to the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam, which has at its disposal significant reserves of American trophy
weapons. In this regard Berhanu Bayeh in the name of the PMAC leadership
expressed a wish that the Soviet side will convince the Vietnamese comrades
to provide, according to their capabilities, the necessary assistance in American
arms, either on a grant basis or on a combined grant and commericial basis.
In this regard he noted that in contrast to the past the PMAC intends
to consider this issue with the Vietnamese directly, rather than running to
the PRC for mediation. For my part, I promised to send through channels
the wishes and requests which had been expressed by Berhanu Bayeh.
At the end of the conversation Berhanu Bayeh made
a personal request that his brother Abraham Bayeh (19 years old) be accepted
into one of the educational institutions of the Soviet Union. Counter-revolutionaries,
including among the student population, threaten his brother with reprisal
for familial relations with the "fascist junta," because of which
Abraham cannot go to school and must hide at another brother's house (Fisseha
Bayeh, jurist). In these circumstances it would be desirable if Abraham
Bayeh could be sent to the USSR as soon as possible. The level of his
education -- 12th (graduating) grade of high school[;] however, because he
currently is not able to attend classes (he studies at home with a teacher)
and take the examinations, he evidently will not manage to receive an official
certificate for finishing high school (he studies in the Wingate school, where
until recently instruction was led by teachers from England).
I told Berhanu Bayeh that I would bring his wish
and thoughts regarding his brother to the attention of the Soviet ambassador.
On a personal plane, I noted that resolving that issue would require consultation
with the appropriate Soviet agencies.
MINISTER-COUNSELOR
OF THE USSR EMBASSY IN ETHIOPIA
/S.
SINITSYN/
[Source:
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll. 93-97; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff.]
Report
from CPSU CC to SED CC, Results of N.V. Podgorny's Visit to Africa, late March
1977 (excerpts)
Strictly
confidential
On
the results of an official visit of N.V. PODGORNY to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique,
and also of an unofficial visit to Somalia and a meeting with the leaders
of the national-liberation organizations of the South of Africa that took
place in Lusaka on 28 March [1977]
[Received
on 19 April 1977]
During the negotiations between N.V. Podgorny and the leaders
of the mentioned countries they discussed issues of bilateral relations and
relevant international issues. The main results of the visit were covered
in published communiques, as well as in joint declarations. In addition, we
would like to inform You in a confidential manner about the following....
During the talks they discussed the issues of the situation in
the African Horn with regard to the aggravation of Ethiopian-Somali relations.
The presidents, particularly Nyerere and [Mozambican President Samora]
Machel, voiced their concern at the growing enmity between the two progressive
countries and expressed regrets regarding the unfriendly position of the Somali
leadership towards the "revolutionary regime" in Ethiopia. In the
opinion of Nyerere, for the foreseeable future one cannot expect the establishment
of a friendly relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia. The maximum one can
achieve is to avoid an open clash between Ethiopia and Somalia, by persuading
both sides of the need to maintain mutual restraint. Nyerere and Machel said
that satisfaction of the territorial demands of Somalia would automatically
result in the collapse of the progressive regime in Ethiopia. All three leaders
evaluated very highly the position of the Soviet Union and agreed with our
opinion that progressive states must more actively come out in support of
the Ethiopian revolution and advocate the normalization of Ethiopian-Somali
relations....
The main topic of conversation [of Podgorny] with Siad Barre
was the issue of the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia, and also the
situation emerging in this region of Africa in connection with activities
of reactionary Arab forces. Exchange of opinions revealed that the Somali
leadership adheres to its old positions regarding its territorial demands
on Ethiopia. Siad Barre justified this stand [by referring] to the pressure
of internal nationalistic circles of Somalia.
At the same time Siad Barre did not deny that there were progressive
developments in Ethiopia. He distanced himself from reactionary leaders of
Arab countries: Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, who sought to liquidate the progressive
regime in Ethiopia. Siad called the President of the UAR [Anwar] Sadat a convinced
adherent of capitalism, a reactionary, anti-Soviet schemer. In the opinion
of Siad, Nimeiry is a man without principles who fell under the influence
of Sadat [and] the leadership of Saudi Arabia, as well as the Americans and
the British.
Siad declared that Somalia, now as before, seeks to expand cooperation
with the USSR. He said that he deems it advisable to hold a meeting
with Mengistu with the mediation of the USSR and underscored that only the
Soviet Union which possesses great authority and experience could help Somalia
and Ethiopia to work out "a formula of honor" that would allow both
countries to find a road to reconciliation without losing face....
[Source:
SAPMO, J IV 2/202 584; obtained and translated from Russian by V. Zubok.]
Transcript
of Meeting between East German leader Erich Honecker and Cuban leader Fidel
Castro, East Berlin,
3 April 1977 (excerpts)
Minutes
of the conversation between Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Fidel Castro,
Sunday, 3 April 1977 between 11:00 and 13:30 and 15:45 and 18:00, House of
the Central Committee, Berlin.
Participants:
Comrades Hermann Axen, Werner Lamberz, Paul Verner, Paul Markowski (with Comrades
Edgar Fries and Karlheinz Mobus as interpreters), Carlos Rafael Rodriguez,
Osmany Cienfuegos, Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes
Comrade Erich Honecker warmly welcomed Comrade
Fidel Castro and the Cuban Comrades accompanying him to this internal conversation
on behalf of the Central Committee.
We are very pleased about your visit to the GDR
and the opportunity to exchange views about the result of your visit to several
African and Arabian countries. On behalf of the Politburo I want to repeat
that we consider your visit to these countries as important. I ask Comrade
Fidel Castro to take the floor.
[first
16 pages omitted--ed.]
Statements by Comrade Fidel Castro: [...] Before
my departure from Aden we discussed with the PDRY leadership the need to do
everything possible to arrive at an understanding between Somalia and Ethiopia.
I was well received in Somalia. I had asked them not to have any public
demonstrations. Siad Barre was very friendly during our first dinner.
Prior to my arrival, I had received his reply to a letter of mine regarding
the question of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. I had also sent
an envoy to Somalia for discussions with Vice President Samantar and Interior
Minister Suleiman. Samantar held to leftist positions, while Suleiman
was a representative of the right wing. The discussion of our representative
with him was very severe. I had already received considerable information
in the PDRY regarding the situation in Somalia. The power and influence
of the rightist group continue to increase. The Interior Minister, Suleiman,
is doing everything possible to bring Somalia closer to Saudi Arabia and the
imperialist countries. Samantar is losing influence. Everything
seems to indicate that he is being driven into a corner by the right.
My first evening I wanted to clarify my thoughts
about Siad Barre and the Somali revolution. No serious political discussion
took place at this dinner; [Siad] Barre explained to me the evolution of the
Somali revolution. The next day, we had an extensive sight-seeing program.
We went to a Cuban-built militia training center, an agricultural school,
a school for nomad children, etc. We were taken around for hours, although
we had not yet had a political discussion, and a mass demonstration had been
scheduled at noon in the stadium. I understood that they wanted to avoid
such a conversation prior to the demonstration. As the demonstration
began, Siad Barre and I had still not had a private conversation, and because
of this I was very careful. Siad Barre was very arrogant and severe;
maybe he wanted to intimidate us.
In my speech to the mass meeting I talked about
imperialist policy in the Middle East, the reactionary role of Saudi Arabia,
and the actions of other reactionary powers. I did this even though
I knew that there was a considerable trend in the country in favor of closer
relations with these countries. I talked about the PLO's struggle, the
Ethiopian revolution, and the Libyan revolution, and of progressive Algeria
that they want to isolate. I talked about Mozambique, and only at the
end about how imperialism is doing everything to reverse the progressive order
in Somalia. Siad Barre introduced me to participants of the mass meeting
without saying a political word.
Before the mass meeting they had played half of
a soccer game. It is unknown whether the soccer game was simply an appendage
to the demonstration or vice versa. My speech went against the right
wing tendencies and supported the left wing. We observed that almost
all of the Central Committee members applauded, with the exception of Suleiman
and his people. Samantar was very satisfied, and even Siad Barre seemed
content. Nevertheless, the mass meeting was not broadcast live on radio
or TV.
Only that evening did we begin to discuss specific
problems, at my residence. It was clear to me that we had to be careful
because surely the interior minister had installed bugs. This same evening
Siad Barre finally talked about Ethiopia. He compared it to the Tsarist
Empire and said that Ethiopia was the only surviving colonial power.
Thanks to Lenin's wisdom, the Tsarist Empire had disappeared, but it lived
on in Ethiopia. He had proposed to the Ethiopians, some time ago, to
establish a federation or even a unification of the two countries. Ethiopia
had not reacted then, but was now itself proposing this solution. He
spoke very enthusiastically about his efforts to reach a solution with Ethiopia.
I used the occasion to tell Siad Barre that I would travel to Ethiopia the
next day and asked him if he would be willing to meet with Mengistu.
He agreed.
The next day I flew on to Ethiopia. We had earlier
agreed that there would be no great reception for me, since at the time they
were still fighting the civil war. Shots constantly rang out. Mengistu took
me to the old Imperial Palace and the negotiations began on the spot. I found
the information that I already had to be confirmed. We continued our negotiations
on the following day. Naturally we had to take extensive security precautions.
The Ethiopians had come up with a division, and I had brought a company of
Cuban soldiers with me. The day of my arrival there were rumors of a coup.
It did not happen.
I developed the impression that there was a real
revolution taking place in Ethiopia. In this former feudal empire, lands were
being distributed to the peasants. Each farmer got 10 hectares. There were
also reforms in the cities. It was established that each citizen could only
own one house. Plots were made available for housing construction.
There is also a strong mass movement. In the capital,
500,000 people can be rapidly mobilized. In February, our study delegation,
after inspecting the army divisions, had determined that of the hundreds of
generals, all but two should be chased out. The officers and NCOs have taken
over the leadership of the country. Currently, the leadership is considering
creating a Party. There is a harsh class struggle against the feudalists in
the country. The petit bourgeois powers are mobilizing against the Revolution.
A strong separatist movement exists in Eritrea. Threats are coming from the
Sudan, while Somalia claims 50% of Ethiopia's territory. There have been border
clashes in this area for 500 years.
Mengistu strikes me as a quiet, serious, and sincere
leader who is aware of the power of the masses. He is an intellectual personality
who showed his wisdom on 3 February. The rightists wanted to do away with
the leftists on 3 February. The prelude to this was an exuberant speech by
the Ethiopian president in favor of nationalism. Mengistu preempted this coup.
He called the meeting of the Revolutionary Council one hour early and had
the rightist leaders arrested and shot. A very consequential decision was
taken on 3 February in Ethiopia. The political landscape of the country changed,
which has enabled them to take steps that were impossible before then. Before
it was only possible to support the leftist forces indirectly, now we can
do so without any constraints.
I asked Mengistu whether he was willing to meet
with Siad Barre in Aden. We agreed. After concluding my talks I flew on to
Aden.
Siad Barre had arrived in Aden that morning. Mengistu
did not arrive until the afternoon. I had a conversation with Siad Barre in
which he bared his claws. He told me that if Mengistu was a real revolutionary
he should do as Lenin, and withdraw from his territory. Siad Barre took a
very hard position. I asked him whether he felt that there had been no real
revolution in Ethiopia and that Mengistu was not a real leftist leader. He
told me that there had been no revolution in Ethiopia. While in Mogadishu
he had shown me a map of Greater Somalia in which half of Ethiopia had been
annexed.
After my talk with Siad Barre, I told Mengistu
about Barre's attitude, and asked him to remain calm. I already felt bad about
having invited Mengistu to Aden while there was still a powder keg situation
back in his country and that in such a tense situation he was to hear out
the Somalis' territorial demands.
With regards to my question about the situation
of the Ethiopian army, Mengistu said that there were still difficulties but
that he didn't think that there was an acute danger of a coup.
When the meeting started, Siad Barre immediately
began speaking. Siad Barre is a general who was educated under colonialism.
The revolution in Somalia is led by generals who all became powerful under
colonial times. I have made up my mind about Siad Barre, he is above all a
chauvinist. Chauvinism is the most important factor in him. Socialism is just
an outer shell that is supposed to make him more attractive. He has received
weapons from the socialist countries and his socialist doctrine is [only]
for the masses. The Party is there only to support his personal power.
In his case there is a bizarre symbiosis of rule
by military men who went through the school of colonialism and social appearances.
Something about socialism appeals to him, but overall there is still a lot
of inequality and unfairness in the country. His principal ideas are nationalism
and chauvinism, not socialism.
His goal is old fashioned politics: sweet, friendly
words. Siad Barre speaks like a wise man; only he speaks. He is different
from the many political leaders that I know. [Egyptian President Anwar]
Sadat, [Algerian President Houari] Boumedienne, [Mozambique President Samora]
Machel, [Angolan President Agostinho] Neto and many others are strong characters.
They can also listen and do not take a dogmatic attitude. One can speak with
them. Siad Barre really thinks that he is at the summit of wisdom. Until now
everything has gone smoothly for him. The Italians and the British made him
a general. The revolution was accomplished in a minute, with hardly a shot
fired. He put on a socialist face and got economic aid and weapons from the
Soviet Union. His country is important strategically, and he likes prestige.
Barre is very convinced of himself. His socialist rhetoric is unbearable.
He is the greatest socialist; he cannot say ten words without mentioning socialism.
With this tone he began to speak in the meeting
with Mengistu. He began giving a lecture on Ethiopia and demanded from Mengistu
to do as Lenin had done: do away with the Ethiopian Empire. Mengistu remained
quiet; he said that Ethiopia was ready and willing to find a solution and
that there needed to be the first concrete steps on both sides to achieve
a rapprochement.
Siad Barre theatrically responded that he was disappointed
with Mengistu and that he displayed the same attitude as the Ethiopian Emperor.
The Ethiopian revolutionary leadership had the same mentality as Haile Selassie.
The meeting had begun at 11 PM and a solution was not in sight.
[Cuban Vice President] Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
then proposed the establishment of a standing commission with representatives
from Ethiopia, Somalia and the PDRY to find ways to a solution. All the other
participants drafted us against our will into this commission.
Siad Barre carried on with his great wise man act,
as the great Socialist, the great Marxist. At the same time he spoke demagogically
as only one member of the "collective leadership" with a mandate
from the Politburo and the need to consult with them on all matters. After
a brief recess for consultations with his delegation he proposed direct talks
between Mengistu and himself.
Mengistu, who had already become more insulted
and mistrustful during Siad Barre's previous statements, said that he
was willing to do so, but not at this time. First the question of the commission
had to be resolved.
We continued the meeting at 3.15 in the morning.
Siad Barre had prepared the text of an agreement in which the idea of the
commission was accepted but which directed that its main purpose should be
to solve the outstanding territorial questions between Somalia and Ethiopia.
The commission would thus take this approach from the start. How were the
Ethiopians supposed to react to such a provocative proposal?
During the break I had spoken with Mengistu, who
did not hide his rejection of Siad Barre. I also spoke with Siad Barre and
asked him whether he was really interested in finding a solution. He
said that Mengistu would have to answer that. He went on with his revolutionary
rhetoric, about how real socialists, revolutionaries, and Marxists could not
deny realities. He said that Mengistu was in fact a drastic man, one who has
taken drastic measures: why could he not decide similarly drastically right
here and now to resolve the question?
In this setting I was faced with the complicated
question of either speaking my mind about Siad Barre's position or keeping
it to myself. I concluded that I had to speak out for the following reasons:
1. Keeping quiet would have meant endorsing the
chauvinistic policy of Somalia, and its consequences. It would also have meant
supporting the rightists in Somalia.
2. Not responding to Siad Barre would mean that
any subsequent aid from socialist countries to Ethiopia, no matter how small,
would be termed by Siad Barre as a betrayal.
3. In what kind of a situation would this put the
PDRY, about to support Ethiopia with tanks, trucks and artillery with the
help of a Soviet ship?
In addition, Siad Barre had not only been insulting,
he was resorting to subtle threats. At a certain point he said that one could
not know where all of this could lead.
Because of this, I spoke up. I explained that Siad
Barre did not believe that there had been a real revolution in Ethiopia, that
the events of 3 February had totally answered this question and that Mengistu
was a revolutionary leader. I went on to say that we considered the events
in Ethiopia as a revolution, that the events of 3 February were a turning
point, and that Mengistu is the leader of a profound transformation. I declared
that we could not possibly agree with Siad Barre's position. I said that Siad
Barre's position represented a danger to the revolution in Somalia, endangered
the revolution in Ethiopia, and that as a result there was a danger of isolating
the PDRY. In particular I emphasized that Siad Barre's policies were aiding
the right wing in Somalia itself in its efforts against socialism, and to
deliver Somalia into the arms of Saudi Arabia and Imperialism.
I said that these policies were weakening Somalia's
relations with the socialist countries and would have to lead to the collapse
of the revolution in Somalia. I appealed to Siad Barre's and the entire Somali
leadership's sense of historical responsibility. I said that I did not think
that this would come to a war between Somalia and Ethiopia but that I was
worried, since war would be a very serious thing. I do not believe that there
are people who would provoke a war between the peoples.
Immediately after my speaking so frankly, Siad
Barre took the floor. He said that he would never want war and that as a socialist
and revolutionary he would never take this path. If the socialist camp wanted
to cut itself off from Somalia then that was the affair of the socialist camp.
I had put pressure on him, Siad Barre, but not demanded from Mengistu, to
come to this meeting.
Now, I pointed out that I had supported the summit
between Siad Barre and Mengistu but did not talk about Siad Barre's insults
vis-a-vis Mengistu. I said that Cuba had no intention of cutting itself off
from the Somali Revolution, rather, we supported it. The whole meeting ended
without any results.
If we now give our aid to Ethiopia, Siad Barre
will have no moral right to accuse us of betrayal, etc. I told him very
clearly that there was a revolution in Ethiopia and that we had to help it.
In any case I had detected during my meetings with
Siad Barre a certain irritation on his part with the Soviet Union. He was
agitated that the Soviet Union was not delivering spare parts or tractors
and that oil came too late from the Soviet Union, in spite of repeated promises.
The Soviet ambassador has explained the state of affairs to us. The Somalis
were repeatedly changing their minds about their requests, which had delayed
the matter. In addition, unfortunately the Soviet oil tanker had sunk on its
way to Somalia.
As I told Siad Barre this, he called the Soviets
liars. He said this was not the position of the Soviet politburo, but rather
the result of sabotage by bureaucrats. His irritation and criticism of the
Soviet Union also showed in other cases. He went on to say that there was
not enough drinkable water in his country and that cattle were dying, the
bananas were ripening too late, all because the pumps provided by the Soviets
did not work.
Because of this attitude of Siad Barre I see a
great danger. That is why I considered it appropriate to give you my impressions
truthfully, without euphemisms.
I wanted to discuss my point of view frankly. The
socialist countries are faced with a problem. If they help Ethiopia, they
will lose Siad Barre's friendship. If they do not, the Ethiopian Revolution
will founder. That was the most important thing about these matters.
[comments
on southern Africa, omitted here, are printed earlier in this Bulletin--ed.]
There were several requests for military aid from
various sides: [Libyan Leader Moammar] Qadaffi, Mengistu, and the Congolese
leaders. During our stay in Africa we sent [Cuban Vice President] Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez to Moscow to confer with our Soviet comrades and to Havana for consultations
with our leadership. In order to find the best solution we must think through
this question calmly and thoroughly and consider it in terms of the overall
situation of the socialist camp. Above all we must do something for Mengistu.
Already we are collecting old weapons in Cuba for Ethiopia, principally French,
Belgian and Czech hand-held weapons. About 45,000 men must be supplied with
weapons. We are going to send military advisers to train the Ethiopian militia
in weapons-use. There are many people in Ethiopia who are qualified for the
army. We are supporting the training of the militia. Meanwhile the situation
in Eritrea is difficult. There are also progressive people in the liberation
movement, but, objectively, they are playing a reactionary role. The Eritrean
separatist movement is being supported by the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
Ethiopia has good soldiers and a good military tradition, but they need time
to organize their army. Mengistu asked us for 100 trainers for the militia,
now he is also asking us for military advisers to build up regular units.
Our military advisory group is active at the staff level. The Ethiopians have
economic means and the personnel necessary to build up their army. Rumors
have been spread lately that the reactionaries will conquer Asmara in two
months. The revolution in Ethiopia is of great significance. With regard to
military aid for the PR Congo and the Libyans we have not yet come to a decision.
I had consultations with Boumedienne in Algeria
and asked for his opinion. He assured me that Algeria would never abandon
Libya. Algeria is very concerned with the situation in the Mediterranean because
of its security interests. It is in favor of supporting Libya, as long as
military aid is confined to the socialist camp. That is not only a question
between Cuba and Algeria. If we succeed in strengthening the revolution in
Libya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the PDRY, and Angola, we have an integrated strategy
for the whole African continent.
Algeria would move closer to the socialist camp.
It bought 1.5 billion rubles of weapons from the Soviets. Boumedienne thinks
that Sadat is totally lost to us. In Syria there is also no leftist movement
any more, either, especially after the Syrians defeated the progressive powers
and the PLO in Lebanon.
[Indian President] Indira Gandhi gambled away the
elections.
In Africa, however, we can inflict a severe defeat
on the entire reactionary imperialist policy. One can free Africa from the
influence of the USA and of the Chinese. The developments in Zaire are also
very important. Libya and Algeria have large national resources, Ethiopia
has great revolutionary potential. So there is a great counterweight to Egypt's
betrayal. It might even be possible that Sadat could be turned around and
that the imperialist influence in the Middle East can be turned back.
This must all be discussed with the Soviet Union.
We follow its policies and its example.
We estimate that Libya's request is an expression
of trust. One should not reject their request. Cuba alone cannot help it.
[remainder
of conversation omitted--ed.]
[Source:
Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen
DDR im Bundesarchiv" (Berlin), DY30 JIV 2/201/1292; document obtained
by Christian F. Ostermann and translated by David Welch with revisions by
Ostermann.]
