Russian
& East German Documents on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, 1977-78
Memorandum
of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.N. Ratanov and Cuban
military official Arnaldo Ochoa, 17 July 1977
TOP
SECRET Copy No. 2
From
the journal of 24 August 1977
A.P.
RATANOV Orig.
No. 297
REPORT
OF CONVERSATION with the head of the Cuban military specialists Division General
ARNALDO
OCHOA, 17 July 1977
During the discussion held at the Soviet Embassy,
the Soviet Ambassador outlined the following considerations on the military
and political situation in Ethiopia.
The capture of several strategically important
objectives in Eritrea and in the eastern regions of Ethiopia by the separatists
and by the Somalis has showed that the PMAC:
1. Underestimated the military capabilities of
the Eritrean separatists, and thus did not take serious measures to strengthen
the group of troops in Eritrea. At the same time the PMAC was hoping that
it would be able to persuade the leadership of the Eritrean organizations
to take part in negotiations on the political settlement of the Eritrean problem.
2. Did not expect that the units of the Somali
regular army in Ogaden would participate directly in the military actions.
It is significant that the Ethiopian command did not take measures for building
a defensive barrier in the regions adjacent to Somalia. Apparently, the PMAC
was concerned that such measures could be perceived by Somalia as an Ethiopian
refusal to settle their disagreements with Somalia peacefully.
3. Overestimated its own military capabilities.
Did not take into account the fact that the old army practically did not go
through the school of revolutionary struggle even though it took part in the
revolution, since the main demands of the rank and file soldiers were for
a raise in pay and for improvement of the retirement pensions, and a certain
part of the officer corps was against the Revolution altogether.
It should be also mentioned that in relation to
Eritrea, during the three years since the Revolution the Ethiopian command
has never attempted any offensive military operations against the Eritrean
armed forces, and that the troops of the Ethiopian regular army were practically
dwelling in their quarters.
Only two or three months ago the PMAC, having received
weapons from the socialist countries, hastily began to organize new units
of the regular army, and the people's militia.
Currently the armed forces of Ethiopia consist
of 6 divisions of the regular army (55 thousand people), 8 divisions of the
people's militia (about 100 thousand people), and police formations (40 thousand
people). However:
1. The Ethiopian army is inferior to the Somali
army in the quality of armaments.
2. The members of the people's militia have not
had a sufficient military training yet.
All this led to the situation where the separatists
were able to establish control over 75-80% of the Eritrean territory, including
the cities of Keren, Nacfa, Karora, Decamere, Tessenei. Their armed forces
consist of 18 thousand people.
The Ethiopian command in Eritrea has 20 thousand
soldiers of the regular army, and it is currently transferring there 5 divisions
of the people's militia. This should give it the opportunity to establish
control over Eritrea assuming that Sudan does not introduce its armed forces
there.
If the military effort in Eritrea is successful,
the PMAC hopes that the separatists and the Arab countries who support them
would have to agree to a political settlement and accept internal autonomy
for Eritrea.
In the Ogaden the detachments of the Front of for
the Liberation of Western Somalia (up to 5 thousand people), introduced mainly
from Somalia, have recently established control over the most part of the
territory. The front is engaged in combat near the cities of Harar, Jijiga,
Gode, Dire Dawa.
The PMAC has up to 10 thousand people in the Ogaden.
Currently detachments of the people's militia are being transferred there.
The Ethiopian command considers the situation in the Ogaden most dangerous
since Somalia continues to transfer its military personnel and heavy weaponry
to that region.
Therefore, the PMAC has a opportunity to change
favorably the military situation in Eritrea as well as in the Ogaden, However,
it would need to solve the following problems.
1. To provide the armed forces with the means of
transportation (helicopters, trucks, etc.) for a
quick transfer of the reserves when and where they are needed.
2. To create fuel reserves and to obtain means
of transportation for them.
3. To create reserves of food and medicines.
Also it is necessary to strengthen the political
work in the armed forces, for which they would need cadres of political workers,
which are currently insufficient.
In socio-political terms the forces of the revolution
predominate over the forces of the counterrevolution. Still, even though the
PMAC undertook certain measures for the organization of the peasant and urban
population (peasant and urban associations have been created everywhere),
the level of political consciousness of the broad masses of the population
(mostly illiterate) remains very low.
Elements of confusion can be observed in the Defense
Council. Mengistu Haile Mariam still remains the main leader of the Ethiopian
revolution. The PMAC needs to solve the following political tasks:
1. To take additional measures to strengthen its
social base. In order to achieve this it is necessary to make the socio-economic
policy more concrete, so that it could assure the peasants that the land would
remain in their possession, and that the regime would not rush with collectivization.
In addition, some measures in order to, as a minimum, neutralize the national
bourgeoisie, are necessary to assure it that the regime would not expropriate
its property.
2. To develop the nationality policy and to make
it more concrete (to create autonomous national regions), even though now
it would not be an easy task because cadres from non-Amhara
nationalities which were discriminated against before the revolution
have not been prepared yet.
3. To create a political party and a broad people's
front with participation of not just workers and peasants, but also with the
national bourgeoisie.
4. To conduct a more active foreign policy, especially
toward African countries, to provide support for
Mengistu's statements at the OAU Assembly in Libreville [Gabon] that Ethiopia
was not going to export its revolution, and that it would follow the course
of nonalignment; to make the program for political settlement of the Ethiopian-Somali
disagreements more concrete.
In the course of further discussion we came to
common conclusions that the difficult situation dictated the necessity of
creating in some form a state defense committee, which would be authorized
to mobilize all forces of the country for the defense of the revolution; of
organizing the highest military command, and at a minimum, of two fronts (Northern
and Eastern) with corresponding command and headquarters structures.
We also agreed that the current structuring of
the armed forces should be reorganized in the future according to modern military
concepts applicable to Ethiopian realities. However, the military incompetence
of the officer corps and conservatism of a certain part of it present obstacles
to this restructuring. For example, the General Staff currently nurtures ideas
of creating tank divisions and an anti-aircraft defense system of the country
by removing those kinds of weapons (tanks, anti-aircraft launchers) from existing
infantry divisions.
On July 16 the Cuban comrades found out that at
the last moment before the group of [PMAC General Secretary] Fikre Selassie
Wogderes was about to leave for Moscow it was decided to ask the Soviet Union
to supply tanks, armored cars, and the like at a time when they have not yet
prepared their cadres for work with the technology they were receiving from
the Soviet Union according to the agreements signed earlier. Arnaldo Ochoa
told Mengistu that such a light-headed approach to serious business might
undermine the prestige of the Military Council. Arnaldo Ochoa had the feeling
that Mengistu understood what he meant.
Another example of such a light-headed, even irresponsible,
approach to the military questions is the idea that somebody is suggesting
to Mengistu about the necessity of preparation of a offensive on Hargeisa
(Somalia), which would give Somalia a reason to start a more massive offensive
in the Ogaden with tanks and aircraft, not to mention the catastrophic political
consequences of such a step for Ethiopia.
Arnaldo Ochoa said that the military failures in
Eritrea led to certain disagreements within the PMAC. A significant part of
the Council proposes that they should now, before any military measures are
taken, try once more to engage in negotiations with the Eritrean organizations.
The majority of the Council, however, thinks that in the existing circumstances,
when the separatists are on the offensive, they would not agree to negotiations,
or they would present ultimata demanding the separation of Eritrea. Therefore,
the majority of the Council believes a combination of military and political
measures should be undertaken, i.e. to propose negotiations to the Eritrean
organizations only after having achieved some military successes.
Arnaldo Ochoa also informed me that in one of their
recent conversations Mengistu said that Ethiopian-Chinese relations were becoming
more and more complicated with every day. The PMAC found out that the PRC
was providing military assistance to the People's Front of Eritrean Liberation.
In relation to this, the PMAC made a decision to limit all relations with
Beijing to the minimum without engaging in an open confrontation, and to devise
measures against Chinese ideological penetration in Ethiopia.
AMBASSADOR
OF THE USSR
IN
SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA
[signature]
/A RATANOV/
[Source:
TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. 141-146; translated by S. Savranskaya.]
